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This dissertation comprises three empirical essays in political economy. The first
essay analyzes  the implementation  of  a  French social  program by subnational
governments following a decentralization reform. Using program implementation
data, it shows that local political environments strongly influence implementation
decisions  after  decentralization,  and  that  decentralization  results  in  an  overall
tightening of benefits.  The second essay reports  the results  of a conjoint  field
experiment involving German welfare offices. Using random assignment of cues
about ethnicity and other characteristics in requests to welfare offices, it is shown
that putative non-German applicants receive replies at the same rate as putative
Germans, but are disadvantaged in terms of the substantive quality of responses.
This  suggests  that  minority  populations  do  experience  discrimination  when
attempting to access social benefits. Finally, the third essay uses micro-level voter
file  data  from  Illinois  to  measure  whether  property  tax  limitations  reduce
participation in local elections. In contrast with prior research, results from panel
regressions with matching adjustments suggest that tax limitations do not affect
political  participation  negatively.  Together,  these  essays  contribute  to  our
understanding of public  finance and social  policy in contexts  characterized  by
multi-level governance.
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In this dissertation, I study various areas of political economy in Western democracies. The first
essay  studies  a  decentralization  reform  to  understand  the  politics  of  local  social  policy
implementation  in  France.  In  the  second  essay,  a  field  experiment  is  used  to  assess
discrimination  against  foreigners  by  the  German  bureaucracy.  The  effects  of  property  tax
limitations on turnout in U.S. municipalities are the subject of the third essay. 
In each of these contexts, interactions across different levels of government, and the distribution
of responsibilities among them, are a key concern. This is perhaps most apparent in the essay on
France, which focuses explicitly on the transfer of implementation and financing responsibility
for a social program to subnational governments. But multi-level governance also looms large in
the other contexts under study. A politically crucial aspect of the tax limitations studied in the
essay on turnout is that they are imposed on local  governments by state legislators or ballot
measures. In the German case, the territorial organization of social policy bureaucracies matters
for their ability to treat all individuals impartially.
In political  economy,  the study of interactions  across different  levels of government  is most
closely associated with the prominent literature on federalism. While this literature has inspired
much of the thinking behind this  dissertation,  one goal  of  the essays  is  to  contribute  to  the
development of a more fine-grained perspective on how the allocation of responsibilities across
levels  of  government  matters  for  policy.  In  this  perspective,  interactions  between  levels  of
government  can  powerfully  affect  policy  outcomes  not  just  in  federal  systems,  but  even  in
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textbook examples  of unitary systems such as France.  And even within federal  systems,  the
territorial organization of public finance and social policy at the sub-state level may be just as
important for policy outcomes as the interactions between states and federal governments that
the literature on federalism tends to focus on.
While the primary interest of the essays is scientific, it is hoped that the lessons learned can also
help inform debates about the policies under study and their reform. 
The  essay  on  the  French  revenu  minimum  d'insertion (RMI)  suggests  that  the  program's
decentralization  to  the  departmental  level  has  effectively  weakened  social  protection  and
increased regional heterogeneity in services provision. In the context of broad debate about the
future  of  the  departments  and  France's  territorial  administration  more  generally  –  and
notwithstanding the fusion of the RMI with other programs into the revenu de solidarité  active
(RSA) in the meantime – the findings suggest that re-centralization could have substantively
important effects on social program implementation.
The  essay  on  Germany  provides  experimental  evidence  that  putative  foreigners  are  treated
unequally when attempting to apply for social benefits that they are eligible for as part of the
Hartz IV program. Against the backdrop of debate about the “intercultural competence” of  the
Jobcenters that administer the benefit, this suggests that additional efforts are indeed required to
attain impartiality in social policy administration. As the observational evidence suggests, the
territorial  organization  of  Jobcenters could  play  a  role  in  explaining  this  pattern.  However,
additional research would be required to more thoroughly assess this possibility.
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Finally, the study of local turnout in the U.S., in contrast to prior research, suggests that property
tax limitations do not appear to decrease turnout. Hence, the sizable effect of these limitations on
tax  revenue  may  come  without  deleterious  consequences  for  the  local  democratic  process.
Whether and in how far this finding is contingent on the intertemporal distribution of tax cap's
fiscal effects is a topic that would merit further study.
The three essays on France, Germany and the United States, are reproduced as chapters below in
this order. Each chapter is self-containing, with its own abstract, bibliography and appendix, to
facilitate reading.
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II. SOCIAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN FRANCE1
Abstract
This  paper  studies  the  political  economy  of  social  policy  implementation.
Leveraging the decentralization of a major French social program, I show that the
local political  environment  strongly shapes subnational implementation choices
when implementation  and financing are delegated  to  subnational  governments.
This  is  despite  the  fact  that  laws  and  rules  governing  the  program  remain
nominally  national.  I  find  that  local  executive  partisanship  and  budgetary
constraints  are  correlated  with  the  generosity  of  benefit  administration  and
investments in active labor market policies. Right-wing executives tend to tighten
cash benefit administration but invest more in active labor market policies relative
to left-wing executives. This is consistent with partisan conflict over the relative
importance  of  activation  versus de-commodification  of recipients.  Variation  in
budgetary constraints also gives rise to divergences in implementation, with richer
jurisdictions  keeping  benefit  administration  relatively  generous  and  investing
more in active labor market programs. In the aggregate, decentralization results in
tighter cash benefit administration and increased variance in active labor market
1 I would like to thank Justin Phillips, Yotam Margalit and Olle Folke for their continued help and support, and
Francesc Amat, Tim Dorlach, Nicolas Duvoux, Andrew Gelman, Anselm Rink and panel participants at the 2015
APSA Annual  Meeting for  feedback.  I  am also very grateful  to  Etienne Wasmer  for  his  feedback  and for
receiving  me at  SciencesPo’s  Laboratory for  Interdisciplinary  Public  Policy Evaluation (LIEPP).  In  France,
Cyprien Avenel, Blandine Destremau, Bernard Dolez, Patrick Le Lidec, Yannick L'Horty, Jean-Luc Outin and
Jean-Louis  Pepin were immensely generous in sharing their expertise on the subject.  I  am very indebted to
Alexandre Biotteau at LIEPP, Odile Gaultier-Voituriez at CEVIPOF, Michèle Lelievre, Mathieu Calvo and Julie
Labarthe at DREES (French Social Ministry), Stephane Donné at the CNAF, Isa Aldeghi at CREDOC, Laurent
de  Boissieu  of  france-politique.fr  and  Patrick  Milhe  Poutingon  for  helping  me  manage  multitudinous  data
request processes. This project has benefited from funding by the Global Public Policy Network (GPPN), the
Alliance program including an Alliance Doctoral Mobility Grant, and a public grant overseen by the French
National  Research  Agency (ANR)  as  part  of  the  “Investissements  d’Avenir”  program (reference:  ANR-11-
LABX-0091, ANR-11-IDEX-0005-02).
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policy effort. I discuss implications for the study of social policy implementation,
the politics of active labor market policies, and differences in benefit take-up.
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1. Introduction 
In social policy as in other areas of state activity, what bureaucracies do on the ground is more
than just a mirror image of written policy. Between abstract laws adopted by legislatures and the
frontline  bureaucrats  facing  benefit  recipients,  highly  elaborate  institutions  are  required  to
implement welfare programs (Lipsky (1980)). Exactly how this process is organized clearly has
the potential  to affect substantive policy content and outcomes.2 However,  implementation is
inherently more difficult to observe than policy in laws and programs; hence, it is only rarely the
object of systematic empirical research.
There is an increasing appreciation that this gap in scholarly attention is highly problematic. For
example, Jacob Hacker has argued that the literature on welfare state retrenchment does not find
evidence of retrenchment simply because it looks in the wrong place. This is because it seeks to
unearth changes in laws and programs, and ignores “subterranean means of policy adjustment”
like  increased  rejections  of  benefits  by  local  officials,  or  “decentralized  cutbacks”  (Hacker
(2004), p. 245). As a consequence, Hacker argues, in modern welfare states “it may become
increasingly  difficult  to  judge  policy  effects  simply  by  reading  statute  books  or  examining
disputes over policy rules. We will need to look at what really happens on the ground.” (ibid., p.
247)
In  an  effort  in  this  direction,  the  present  paper  studies  the  “subterranean”  politics  of
implementation  by  examining  how  the  local  political  environment  shapes  implementation
choices in a major French social program; the revenu minimum d’insertion (RMI) or minimum
2 To take an extreme example, few would doubt that social protection would be weakened if welfare offices 
reduced their opening hours to half an hour per week and ceased to be reachable by phone.
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integration income. The program combines cash benefit and labor market integration services,
and its financing and implementation were decentralized to subnational governments headed by
elected officials in a 2004 reform. Although policy parameters governing the benefit remained
national,  decentralization  did  enable  officials  to  affect  policy  content  using  “subterranean”
administrative measures that affect how easily benefits are accessible for recipients.
I use detailed data on the implementation of the program before and after the reform across all
subnational governments to examine the political determinants of implementation decisions. In
particular,  I  hypothesize  that  under  decentralization,  two  aspects  of  the  local  political
environment should affect how subnational governments implement national social policy: the
partisanship of subnational executives and the budgetary constraints they face. 
With regard to the partisanship of executives, research strongly suggests that parties maintain
distinct positions on social programs (Nygård (2006), Slapin and Proksch (2008), Bakker et al.
(2015)). Correspondingly, a large body of literature has assessed the role of partisan conflict in
the making of social policy (Korpi and Palme (2003), Allan and Scruggs (2004), Iversen and
Stephens (2008)), finding that government partisanship is strongly related to policy change. I
argue  that  conditional  on  policy,  this  logic  should  extend  to  implementation  as  well:  local
partisan executives, if given power over implementation, should be expected to use this leverage
to shift policy content towards their preferred outcome. 
Analogously,  budgetary  conditions  have  been  widely  used  to  explain  social  policy  making:
Research examining both social policy expansion and retrenchment has frequently emphasized
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the role of budgetary factors in policy change (Pierson (1998), Pierson (2001)). I hypothesize
that  budgetary  considerations  should  also  affect  implementation  decisions:  subnational
executives exposed to more intense budgetary pressure should implement programs with a view
to reducing program generosity and curtailing expenditure.
Both  hypotheses  are  confirmed  in  my analyses  of  RMI implementation  data.  Following  the
decentralization  of  the  program,  implementation  decisions  are  strongly  associated  with  local
partisanship  and  budgetary  conditions:  conservative  executives  tend  to  take  administrative
measures to suppress enrollment in cash benefits and increase controls of recipients, but expand
active labor market policy relative to leftist executives. This, I argue, is consistent with partisan
conflict over the relative priority of “activation” (the targeted use of benefits to push recipients
onto the labor market and reduce long-term benefit  receipt)  versus “decommodification” (the
insulation  of  recipients  from market  pressures  through  generous  benefits)  (Esping-Andersen
(1990),  Huo  Nelson  and  Stephens  (2008)).  Budgetary  factors  also  powerfully  shape
implementation  in  the  expected  direction:  Executives  faced  with  tighter  budget  constraints
decrease labor market integration spending and tighten cash benefits. Finally,  I document the
aggregate  effects  of  decentralization,  showing that  cash  benefit  administration  is  tighter  and
active labor market policy effort much more heterogeneous under decentralized implementation
and financing of the program.
The study contributes to the political economy literature on several different levels. 
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First, it documents that local political environments shape social policy implementation within a
nominally national policy, with important repercussions for the substance of social protection.
This suggests that theories of policymaking which emphasize partisan and budgetary factors may
usefully  be  extended  to  the  study of  implementation  decisions  –  even in  contexts  featuring
relatively strong bureaucratic institutionalization and stringent monitoring.
At  the  same  time,  implementation  decisions  of  the  type  studied  here  may  be  an  important
mechanism driving previous findings relating partisanship to policy outcomes at the subnational
level. A growing literature examining the reduced-form relationship between partisanship and
policy  outcomes  in  different  subnational  and  local  settings  using  regression  discontinuity
designs has tended to find partisan effects on policy (Petterson-Lidblom (2008), Folke (2014),
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), Leigh (2008)). However, what the outcome measures used in these
types of studies often capture is a mix of policy setting and the implementation of a given policy.
Therefore, it is a priori unclear which mechanisms account for the findings obtained. By contrast,
the research design of the present study allows me to isolate implementation from policy, and
results  suggest that  implementation decisions  themselves  give rise to partisan divergences  in
realized policy outcomes.
Second,  the study contributes  to  our  understanding of  the  role  of  “subterranean” reforms in
welfare state retrenchment in France and elsewhere. I show that, along the lines of arguments
made by Hacker (2004) and others, relatively unassuming changes to program organization can
nevertheless lead to a substantively important weakening of social protection – a finding that
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might  also apply in  other  contexts  characterized  by increasing  social  policy decentralization
(Kuhlmann, Bogumil, Ebinger, Grohs and Reiter (2011)). 
Third,  the study is  the first  to  conduct  a detailed  micro-level  analysis  of  the RMI’s  reform,
providing an opportunity to quell discord about the reform’s effects in the extant literature. Some
previous studies relying on highly aggregated data and case studies of a few departments have
argued that decentralization “did not translate into divergences or inequalities in access to social
policy  rights”  (Thierry  (2008)),  and  that  the  “envisaged  risk  of  a  politicization  of  the
management principles of the RMI does not seem to have played a role” (Pepin and Blandin
(2007), p. 74). Likewise, an analysis of CAF data by Avenel (2007) suggests that implementation
did not become politicized,  stating that “the technical and regulatory character of the program
(the  criteria  of  which  are  nationally  defined)  has  “neutralized”  the  leanings  of  departmental
politics”  (ibid.,  p.  35).  These  findings  contrast  starkly with statements  in  a  more  theoretical
literature  arguing that  decentralization  has  engendered  a  rupture with the principles  of  legal
equality and national solidarity in favor of the autonomy of territorial units (e.g. Destremau and
Messu (2008), Donier (2010), Dubois (2012)). However, the existing evidentiary basis for both
views  is  rather  thin,  leaving  the  debate  at  an  impasse.  The  comprehensive  analysis  of
implementation  data  at  the  subnational  level  undertaken  here  provides  strong  evidence  of
politically  motivated  implementation  of  the  program  after  decentralization:  the  leanings  of
departmental  politics do not,  in fact,  appear  to have been “neutralized” by the technical  and
regulatory character of the program.
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The remainder of the article proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the RMI program and its
decentralization,  while  Section  3 portrays  the partisan  and budgetary logics  of  the program.
Section 4 describes the different data used in the study; Section 5 presents the empirical results
obtained, and Section 6 concludes.
2. The RMI and its decentralization
Within the French social policy regime, the RMI marked a structural change when it was written
into  law  in  1988.  French  welfare  efforts,  grouped  under  the  label  of  continental,  Christian
democratic welfare states by Esping-Andersen (1990), had been focused on contributory systems
of social  insurance, based on fragmented funds separated between occupations, and managed
jointly  by employers  and unions  (Palier  (2000)).  With  high  structural  unemployment  in  the
1980s, these systems did little for those citizens that had little or no connection to the labor
market,  resulting  in  increasing  concerns  about  social  exclusion.  In  1988,  the  Socialist
government responded with the creation of the RMI, a means-tested cash benefit that guaranteed
a certain minimum income (the benefit shrinking with increasing income up to the eligibility
threshold) to anyone over the age of 25. 
This cash benefit was financed wholly by the national government, and benefit payments were
made by the CAF (Caisse d’allocations familiales), a national welfare payments agency with
local branches. Besides the cash benefit,  the RMI law also provided for so-called integration
(insertion) programs intended to combat social exclusion. As part of this integration program,
every  RMI  recipient  was  supposed  to  sign  an  individualized  integration  contract  (contrat
d'insertion) with a social  worker that would specify a plan of re-integration through training
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measures,  participation  in  social  programs and job search (Palier  and Thelen (2010),  Lafore
(2003), Duvoux (2011)). 
These integration programs were organized jointly by the central government and executives at
the  subnational  level  of  so-called  departments  (départements)  (Bouchoux,  Houzel  and Outin
(2004)). Departments are a French subnational administrative and political unit since Napoleonic
times. These bodies, of which there are 96 in mainland France, have their own tax revenues,
budgets and elected councils. They are governed by the Council President who is elected by the
new council  after  every council re-election (half of the councillors are replaced every 3 to 4
years) and who becomes the executive of the departmental bureaucracy, which numbers about
3,500  staff  per  department  on  average.   Departments  were  responsible  for  budgeting  and
financing the integration programs, but a fixed minimum amount of expenditure (17% of cash
benefits paid out) was mandated by law in order to prevent departments from saving money on
integrating recipients. 
Decentralization 
Departments  and their  elected executives  became crucial  to the RMI when the program was
decentralized by a conservative government in 2003 (Le Lidec (2011)). The reform dramatically
changed  the  program’s  organization  by  giving  departments complete administrative  and
budgetary responsibility over both the cash benefit and the integration parts of the program. The
funding of the program as well as all practical decisions about implementation were now in the
hands of departments, and specifically in the hands of their elected executives, the departmental
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council  Presidents  (Tuchszirer  and Join-Lambert  (2003),  Kuhlmann  et  al.  (2011),  Inspection
générale des affaires sociales (2007), Avenel (2007)).
However, a legislative amendment that would have allowed departments to actually change key
parameters of the policy, like benefit levels and eligibility criteria, failed. Therefore, the general
legal  rules  governing  the  RMI  remained  unchanged,  and  benefits  and  eligibility  were  still
determined by national law even after decentralization. 
As a consequence, departments were empowered to make decisions on the implementation of
policy,  but  not  about  the  policy  itself.  The  latitude  offered  to  departments  can,  with  some
simplification, be conceptualized as consisting of two dimensions: the tightness of cash benefit
administration, and the emphasis accorded to recipient re-integration.
As concerns the cash benefit administration dimension,  departmental executives had to decide
on a whole host of implementation questions following decentralization: they could decide where
applicants would be able to apply for the benefit and delineate how they assessed compliance or
non-compliance  with  integration  contracts.  They  also  decided  whether  and  how severely  to
sanction  non-compliance  with the  contract  or  no-shows at  appointments  by suspending cash
benefits, how to treat administrative errors leading to overpayments, cash advances for expected
future benefits in cases of hardship, how frequently to control recipients to verify eligibility, and
a host of other issues. These aspects can seem small and mundane when considered in isolation.
However, taken together, they can affect the substance of the program, especially in terms of
how easy it is for potential recipients to apply for and continue receiving cash benefits. 
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As concerns  the  integration  dimension  of  the  RMI,  spending  requirements  were  lifted,  and
departments could freely decide on the total budget allocated to integration programs following
decentralization. This gave them a free hand to prioritize or de-prioritize integration relative to
all other areas of department expenditure. Within the integration budget, they could also freely
choose which programs to offer: this implied deciding between labor market programs and other
social programs less explicitly targeted at returning recipients to work, like health or housing
benefits.  Moreover,  department  executives  were  authorized  to  independently  organize  and
instruct the department bureaucracy responsible for integration services. Crucially, this includes
the definition of integration efforts that would be demanded in integration contracts, the intensity
and frequency of follow-ups and meetings, et cetera. 
3. Partisan and budgetary logics in the RMI
I  hypothesize  that  two aspects  of  the local  political  environment  – the  partisanship  of  local
executives  and  the  budgetary  situations  they  face  –  affect  what  executives  do  on  the  two
dimensions of local implementation latitude. In this section I briefly explain the logic behind
these hypotheses.
The partisan cleavage about the RMI program dates back to the moment of its  introduction.
While the left and right in the French National Assembly agreed on the need for a new social
inclusion program, they had very different  ideas about the benefits  and obligations  it  should
entail. As Eydoux and Tuchszirer (2010) describe in their analyses of the parliamentary records,
conservative parties argued that the obligation to integrate fell on recipients. In their view, cash
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benefits should be the reward given to recipients in exchange for making efforts to re-integrate
into the labor market and work. As a deputy from the conservative RPR argued, this required the
possibility  of  “suspending  the  payment  of  the  benefit  if  the  person  does  not  respect  her
commitments”  (ibid.,  p.  7).  For  another  deputy  of  the  conservative  UDF,  “the  integration
contract must be perceived by the recipient as a firm commitment upon which the payment of the
benefit is conditioned, since it is essential for the RMI not to become a new form of assistance”
(ibid.). This worry about a “new kind of assistance”  highlights concerns about disincentives and
increased unemployment due to social policy that were and are frequently voiced in the debates
about social policy in France.
By contrast, the governing Socialist Party in the French National Assembly saw the integration
part of the policy as the expression of an obligation of society to integrate recipients instead of
only giving them cash benefits. It therefore objected to making benefits conditional on “good
behavior” or imposing a work requirement for recipients: giving aid to recipients took priority
over concerns about disincentive effects. A compromise between these positions was eventually
found, and the bill that passed did contain a requirement for recipients to sign an integration
contract outlining measures they should take to integrate, though only after they had first applied
for cash benefits.
This partisan cleavage, which accompanied political discussions of the RMI from its inception
onward, is best understood as emanating from political  conflict  about the RMI’s potential  to
decommodify recipients.3 As Esping-Andersen (1990) has argued in developing this concept, a
3 Chemin and Wasmer (2004) provide evidence that the introduction of the RMI did have disincentive effects on
recipients, increasing unemployment.
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core characteristic of modern welfare states is the extent to which the social rights they grant
allow citizens to live without relying on markets. But the extent to which the RMI could de-
commodify  its  recipients  depended  quite  directly  on  the  details  of  its  implementation:  As  a
relatively  generous  cash  benefit  without  an  explicit  legal  work  requirement,  the  RMI could
substantially decommodify a considerable fraction of the French unemployed when administered
leniently.  However,  with  demanding  integration  contracts,  frequent  controls  and  tight
conditionality of the cash benefit on recipient effort,  the very same policy on paper could be
geared  much  more  towards  recipient  activation (in  the  terminology  of  Bonoli  (2010)  and
Gingrich and Häusermann (2015)), and have its decommodifying effect reduced. 
I  hypothesize that  giving partisan departmental  executives  latitude over RMI implementation
effectively allowed them to move policy content closer to their preferred outcome by choosing
whether  to  prioritize  decommodification  or  activation.  Importantly  for  this  argument,  the
departmental party system very closely resembles the national party system in France, and party
positions  are  strongly  homogeneous  across  levels  of  government.4 Consequently,  the  party
affiliation of executives should affect how the RMI was implemented in departments: right-wing
executives  should  administer  cash  benefits  more  restrictively  than  left-wing  ones,  and  they
should insist more on labor market integration effort and conditionality of benefits.
The second aspect of local political environments hypothesized to affect implementation is each
department’s budgetary situation. Assessing the role of budgetary pressures in the making of
implementation  decisions  requires  an  understanding of  the  public  finance  changes  that  RMI
4 In fact, departmental politicians are not infrequently also national politicians in the French Senate or National
Assembly simultaneously, a practice called mandate cumulation (cumul des mandats) which is currently being
phased out.
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decentralization engendered. In exchange for being burdened with full budget responsibility for
cash benefits and integration, departments were allocated revenue from the domestic gasoline
tax.  This  compensation,  granted  in  the  form of  a  fixed  share  of  gasoline  tax  revenues,  was
calibrated  to  equal  the  level  of  spending  that  had  been  required  in  the  year  before
decentralization.  Importantly,  this  revenue allocation  was  not made  contingent  on the future
development of RMI recipients or cash benefits. Any deviation, positive or negative, between
this allocation and the real costs of running the RMI program would have to be absorbed by the
departmental  budget.  Departments  thus  actually  became fully  responsible  for  funding in  the
sense that they could use extra revenue from other sources to increase social spending, but could
also use funds not used for social spending on other purposes or to lower taxes.
The  fiscal  compensation  from  the  gasoline  tax  turned  out  to  grow  much  less  than  the
expenditures on the RMI, resulting in a 450 million Euro deficit in the first year (Senat francais
(2005), Kuhlmann et al. (2011)).  In response to this, an additional budget allocation was made to
departments for RMI spending from 2006, but its total amount was limited and it never fully
compensated  departments  according  to  Audit  Court  reports  (Cour  des  Comptes  (2011a),
Inspection générale des affaires sociales (2007)). Nationally,  actual RMI costs to departments
exceeded  the  transfers  they  received  by  about  13%,  adding  to  their  budgetary  pressure.  In
summary, between 2004 and 2008, departments were only partially compensated for changes in
their  RMI  expenditure  and  suddenly  faced  real  trade-offs  between  social  spending,  other
spending, and taxation decisions.
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These budgetary trade-offs were faced by departmental executives whose budget situations were
highly heterogeneous to begin with. In particular, the strength of tax bases and the importance of
transfers  and  mandated  expenditure  from  the  national  government  vary  widely  across
departments. I hypothesize that this should matter for RMI implementation decisions following
decentralization:  executives  facing  higher  budgetary  pressure  should  be  more  likely  to  use
implementation levers — tighter cash benefit administration, decreased investment in integration
services — to save on RMI expenditure. 
It is worth pointing out that in the lead-up to decentralization, several actors voiced concerns
along the lines of the hypotheses above, fearing that implementation decisions could become a
function of partisanship and budgetary pressures. For example, in a parliamentary debate about
the reform law, the Socialist Party (PS) deputy Gaëtan Gorce expressed worries about allowing
executives to decide sanctioning policy:
“If  we demand that  suspension decisions  be subordinated to  a recommendation by the local
bureaucracy  [instead of  a  decision  by  the  elected  President  of  the  department  council],  it’s
because we fear that the resources transferred by the national state will not cover the needs and
that certain Presidents of departmental councils, having to choose between more firmness in the
renewal of cash benefits and increasing their local taxes, will privilege the former option, which
would contradict the requirements of solidarity” (Eydoux and Tuchszirer (2010), p. 11). 
However,  as  discussed above,  the extant  empirical  research literature  on the subject  has  not
found evidence of politically motivated implementation, concluding that the heavily bureaucratic
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character  of  the  policy  has  “neutralized”  departmental  politics  (Avenel  (2007)).  Dissenting
research that claims decentralization to have engendered politicized program implementation is
almost entirely legal-theoretical in nature and does not engage with the empirical data available
(e.g. Destremau and Messu (2008), Donier (2010), Dubois (2012)). As a consequence, there is at
present little in the way of evidence to adjudicate on the competing claims.
4. Data and empirical analysis
4.1. Data
In order to make an empirical contribution to this debate, I analyze four different types of data at
the department level. They cover implementation and spending decisions made by departments
as well as surveys of RMI program participants. Specifically, I analyze
 an  internal  administrative  survey on the  effects  of  decentralization  conducted  by  the
national benefit payments agency (CAF) in 2006,
 the results of an audit of a sub-sample of local social policy bureaucracies and their links
with local governments conducted by the French Audit Court in 2011, 
 an administrative panel dataset from the Ministry of Social Affairs covering spending on
programs for social and labor market integration of recipients from 1996 to 2008 and
 a repeated cross-sectional survey of RMI recipients conducted by the research unit of the
French Ministry of Social Affairs (DREES) in 2003 and 2006 
The end of the observation period is 2009, when the RMI was amalgamated with other programs
into the revenu de solidarité active (RSA).
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Some of these sources also contain interesting qualitative data. I adduce this data and explain the
quantitative measures in more detail in the respective sections. Throughout the study, I focus on
the two dimensions of RMI implementation defined above, namely
(1) tightness of cash benefit administration: the degree to which implementation is favorable 
to  applicants  receiving  cash  benefits,  including  whether  and  how strongly  receipt  is
conditioned on behavior
(2) importance  accorded  to  re-integration  programs:  the  intensity  of  efforts  directed  at
integrating recipients in society and the labor market
 
In each of the datasets, I identify the measures that best match with these dimensions and use
them as dependent variables. 
To measure the partisan orientation of the departmental executive, I use data on the party of the
President  of the departmental  council.  Presidents  are  elected  after  every new election  to  the
department  (when half  of all  seats  are  renewed,  every 3 or  4  years)  and have wide-ranging
powers  in  the  local  administration.  When  no single  party  attains  a  majority  in  the  council,
coalitions form to elect a President, and other offices are given to the party whose candidate is
not the President. After RMI decentralization in 2004, the President’s powers notably include
final authority over all RMI decisions and the preparation of the RMI integration budget. On the
basis of the President’s party affiliation, I construct both a simple left/right dichotomous coding
of departmental governments, and a more nuanced continuous measure of political orientation
based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey Survey (Bakker et al. (2015)). For this latter measure, I
20
use the “economic policy” dimension of the expert coding, which maps parties on the left-right
spectrum. The measure ranges from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).5
To measure budget situations across departments, I use a measure of budgetary pressure that was
fortuitously produced by a French Senate report in 2003, just before the RMI’s decentralization.
Since the French fiscal system involves massive transfers between levels of government as well
as  heterogeneities  in  mandated  expenditure,  conditional  and  unconditional  grants  based  on
formulas and special programs, measuring a department’s budgetary situation is quite complex.
The measure developed by the French Senate begins with a measure of the strength of the tax
base of the departments, and then corrects for transfers and mandated expenditure to arrive at a
continuous measure of the budgetary pressure on a department. This measure is dimensionless,
and higher values indicate a more favorable budget situation.6
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  measures  of  partisanship  and the  budgetary  situation  are  almost
perfectly uncorrelated with each other (Pearson’s R of 0.01). In the regressions below, I include
other covariates in order to rule out alternative explanations involving other characteristics of the
departments.  These  include  the  level  of  unemployment,  the  relative  size  of  the  immigrant
population, population density, and the number of RMI recipients per department, based on data
from the statistical agency INSEE.7 Descriptive statistics are available in Appendix section 7.1.,
Table 8.
5 An explanation of the partisan coding, as well as a list of the scores, can be found in Appendix section 7.2.
6 The measure is not available for Paris since its public finance situation is very particular.
7 For  example,  Duguet,  Goujard  and  L’Horty  (2009)  document  the  important  differences  in  labor  market
opportunities  across  municipalities.  Administrations  may take  such  factors  into  consideration  when making
implementation decisions; for example, punitive implementation might be easier to sustain in contexts with more
labor market opportunities.
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4.2. Internal CAF data
I first investigate data from an internal survey of the CAF. As explained above, the CAF is
charged with actually paying the cash benefits  to recipients,  and dealing with benefit-related
questions and problems. This means that it maintains databases of recipients, receives recipients
in its offices, and administers changes to their status or payment modalities, including sanctions
or deletions.  Although the CAF has regional  offices across France,  it  is  part  of the national
bureaucracy and tasked primarily with implementing national programs. 
Decentralization gave departmental authorities the power to demand administrative changes from
the CAF. For example, departments could ask CAFs to increase controls on recipients, or allow
the  CAF  to  accept  applications  at  its  offices  (instead  of  requiring  applicants  to  visit  the
departmental social policy offices). Moreover, if departments wanted to sanction recipients or
delete them from the rolls entirely, they needed to do so using a request to the CAF, since it
maintains the recipient database. Therefore, regional CAFs are very well-informed about their
department’s  position  on  RMI  implementation,  yet  are  not  politically  accountable  to  them,
making them an ideal source of information for the purposes of this study.
The survey I analyze  was administered by the national  CAF to the management  level  of all
regional CAF offices in 2006. The goal was to find out how decentralization affected the work of
the departmental CAF offices, mostly for internal management purposes. The survey was filled
out  by very senior bureaucrats,  typically  the director  or deputy director  of the CAF in each
department.  These  bureaucrats  are  highly  familiar  with  policy  and  management  issues  and
relationships  with  the  departmental  actors  in  social  policy,  though  probably  somewhat  less
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familiar with the street-level work done by their colleagues given that an average CAF has about
315 staff.  Owing to the nature of the survey, responses are available for all but 2 of the CAF
offices,  and  there  is  almost  no  non-response  (besides  “no  opinion”  answers)  on  individual
questions.
A broad overview of response averages was published (Avenel (2007)), but the full department-
level results of the survey were not made publicly available. This means that responses are likely
driven by a  general  concern to  demonstrate  the good functioning of the local  branch to  the
central national office and desires to advance in the organization, rather than by worries about
the scientific or political use of the data. Even more importantly, the results were not shared with
departmental  bureaucracies,  and  CAF  bureaucrats  freely  answered  questions  about  their
cooperation with departmental bureaucracies.
Six  questions  in  the  survey  relate  to  access,  conditionality  and  integration  efforts.  Three
questions asked about specific measures taken by departments and implemented by CAFs. They
asked (1) whether, since decentralization, the regime of controls on recipients was tightened and
by  how  much  (2)  whether,  since  decentralization,  demands  for  temporary  sanctions  by  the
department  went  up  or  down  (3)  whether,  since  decentralization  demands  for  permanent
sanctions (deletion) by the department went up or down.
Three additional  questions attempt to measure overall  policy content from the perspective of
recipients.  They  ask  (4)  whether,  from  the  standpoint  of  recipients,  access  to  benefits  had
improved or deteriorated since decentralization, (5) whether, from the standpoint of recipients,
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the management of benefits had improved or deteriorated since decentralization, and (6) whether,
from  the  standpoint  of  recipients,  integration  services  had  improved  or  deteriorated  since
decentralization. 
As  the  reader  will  have  noted,  these  questions  were  all  phrased  to  encourage  comparison
between  the  pre-centralization  era  and  the  time  since  2004.  Although  this  design  arguably
improves the measures over a pure cross-section taken after decentralization, it is not explicitly
based  on  comparisons  of  two  independent  measurements  before  and  after  decentralization.
Therefore, the degree to which these measures can succeed at eliminating the department fixed
effect in comparisons cannot be ascertained. 
In the 9 cases where there were two instead of one CAF districts  per department  in 2006, I
employed the average response given by the two bureaucrats  as the recorded outcome at the
departmental level in order to use all available information.
In the national aggregate, the data give several insights into the effects of decentralization. First,
the control regime applied to RMI recipients tightened considerably: all offices responded either
no change or an increase of controls (Figure 1). 
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Similarly,  regarding sanctions,  the aggregate  data  suggest that  both temporary sanctions  and
deletions increased but that they did so unevenly across departments (Figure 2).8 Overall, these
responses  are  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  decentralization  led  to  a  more  punitive
administration of benefits in the aggregate, though not homogeneously so across locales.
8 Sanctions consist of either a temporary suspension of payments, or a quasi-permanent deletion from the file and
are typically pronounced based on non-compliance with an integration contract or a delay in supplying required
documents. Again, local bureaucracies have ample latitude in interpreting the legal provisions regarding these
sanctions, and can basically choose not to apply them at all, or to apply them as harshly as legally possible
(though  legal  recourse  is  possible  for  beneficiaries).  Importantly,  the  distinction  between  temporary  and
permanent sanctions is not extremely clear cut, partly since many temporary suspensions result in permanent
sanctions over time, and because the precise handling of these sanctions differs across departments. 
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Figure  1:  Frequency  of  CAF responses  to  question  of  whether  the  control
regime tightened since the 2004 decentralization
Figure 3 displays results of the questions asking how “from the standpoint of recipients”, the
program had evolved since decentralization. These questions are particularly interesting for the
purposes of this study since they encourage respondents to produce a comprehensive assessment
of policy content.  The result  shows that on balance,  access  to benefits  and management  are
judged to have stayed roughly similar. However, they deteriorated in about twenty departments
and improved in another twenty. Integration is the exception to this picture; it is judged to have
improved significantly in most departments.9
9 However,  it  should be noted that the CAF is not involved in integration work itself (with some very minor
exceptions),  and  this  judgment  is  therefore  to  be  interpreted  as  an  “outside”  judgment  of  the  work  of  the
departmental bureaucracy. Perhaps for this reason, the question on integration is the only one with significant
“no opinion” response (by 35 CAF offices).
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Figure  2:  Frequency  of  CAF  responses  to  questions  of  whether  temporary
(suspensions) or permanent sanctions (deletions) had increased or decreased
since decentralization.
 
In order to test the hypotheses explained above and assess the role of local political environments
in  RMI  implementation,  I  regress  these  measures  on  department  executive  partisanship  and
budgetary situation. Tables 1 and 2 contain the regression results for all outcomes. Below, graphs
are displayed for the relationships that are statistically significant in those regressions. 
Partisanship is strongly correlated with changes in the control regime and recipient’s access to
benefits. As Figure 4 indicates, departments governed by right-wing executives appear to have
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Figure  3:  Frequency  of  CAF  responses  to  questions  of  whether  from  the
standpoint  of  recipients,  access  to  benefits,  benefit  management,  and
integration, respectively, had improved or deteriorated since decentralization.
tightened control  regimes  more drastically  than those governed by left-wing executives  after
decentralization. 
Moreover,  access  to rights is  judged to have improved in jurisdictions  governed by the left,
whereas recipients in the average department governed by conservatives experienced a slight
deterioration in access to benefits according to the survey (Figure 5). Both results are consistent
with the hypothesis  that  partisan executives  used their  latitude over implementation to move
policy content towards their preferred position.
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Figure 4: Partisanship of the department council President and change in the
control regime  since decentralization as assessed by CAF bureaucrats. Higher
values  on  the  x-axis  indicate  more  conservative  parties.  Lowess  regression,
observations jittered to make distributions visible. 
 
The budget situation in departments is strongly associated with changes in the sanctioning policy
and the quality of integration services, as assessed by the CAF. Suspensions of benefits generally
increased following decentralization. However, they are judged to have increased relatively more
in departments with higher budgetary pressure, as Figure 6 shows. 
29
Figure  5:  Partisanship  of  the  department  council  President  and  change  in
access to benefits since decentralization as assessed by CAF bureaucrat heads.
Higher values on the x-axis indicate more conservative parties. Higher (lower)
values on the y-axis indicate improved (diminished) access to benefits. Lowess
regression, observations jittered to make distributions visible.
Budgetary pressure also appears to have affected the quality of integration services offered to
recipients: As Figure 7 shows, all of the departments that reportedly experienced deteriorations
in integration policy score below the median (-2)  in the budgetary pressure variable. Recall that
mandatory  spending  thresholds  for  integration  services  were  lifted  in  the  reform,  allowing
departments to freely reduce spending if they so desired. This result from the CAF survey is
consistent with the notion that departments with weaker budgets were more likely to make use of
this  possibility.  I investigate  spending on integration programs in more detail  in section 4.4.
below.
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Figure  6:  Budgetary  situations  in  departments  and  change  in  sanctions
demanded by department according to CAF, in departments with strong (gold)
and weak (grey)  budgets (cut  at  the median).  Lowess estimate,  observations
jittered to make distribution visible.
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Figure  7:  Budgetary  situations  in  departments  and  change  in  quality  of
integration as assessed by CAF, in departments with strong (gold) and weak
(grey) budgets (cut  at  the median).  Lowess estimate,  observations jittered to
make distribution visible.
Table 1: Regressions of CAF indicators on budgetary and partisan variables without controls.
The point estimates in Table 1 are robust to the inclusion other covariates as controls in the
regression (Table  2).  However,  standard errors increase in  some cases,  with the relationship
between budgetary pressure and integration services becoming insignificant.
The  CAF  dataset  also  contains  some  interesting  qualitative  information  in  administrator’s
responses  to  open-ended  questions.  While  the  representativeness  of  these  qualitative  data  is
difficult to ascertain, they do allow one to get a perception of the bureaucracy’s view on the RMI
and its decentralization. 
Based on their responses, quite a few administrators perceive some conflict between the goals of
the social policy bureaucracy and those of the local executives. In response to a question about
their relationship, an administrator in a department with a leftist executive writes that there are
“two logics: one of financial control for the departmental council, and one of social and equitable
administration for recipients no matter which benefits are concerned (for the CAF)”. In the same
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Table 2: Regressions of CAF indicators on budgetary and partisan variables with controls.
vein,  an  administrator  from  a  conservatively  governed  department  states  that  “one  notes  a
particular  pre-occupation  with  RMI  expenditure  on  the  side  of  the  departmental  council
generally”. 
The imperative to reduce expenditure is at  times directly related to implementation decisions
taken,  notably  with  regards  to  the  policy  of  controls.  As  a  manager  from one  department
governed by the left writes, “the reinforcement of the control policy has its origins primarily in
the  desire  to  contain  RMI  expenditures”.  Regarding  controls,  administrators  from  two
conservative departments state that their council has demanded “severely increased strictness of
controls”. A third administrator in a department with a conservative executive complains about
the council’s demands for additional controls, stating that “the general council  solicits  us for
presumed  cases  of  fraud  based  on  the  views  of  elected  officials  that  are  founded  not  on
administrative  diagnoses,  but  on  “sentiments”.  The  CAF  should  not  participate  in  this
approach.”.  Conversely,  in a department governed by the far left,  an administrator notes that
“aside from outright frauds, the demands for controls are, until now, much less important than
before [decentralization]”. 
Finally, in response to an open-ended question asking bureaucrats whether they have any other
remarks  they  would  like  to  make,  an  administrator  from a  department  with  a  conservative
executive states rather unequivocally: “the decentralization of the RMI has engendered a rupture
with equal treatment for all beneficiaries nationally, and for complex cases”.
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4.3. Audit Court data 
In 2011, after the RMI had already been reformed again and amalgamated with other programs,
the French Audit Court audited 17 departments to assess their management of the program and
the effectiveness of their integration programs. To this end, it dispatched auditors from regional
Audit  Courts  to  the  local  bureaucracies  and  requested  data  and  answers  to  a  systematic
questionnaire  from  them.  The  detailed  reports  and  analyses  for  the  whole  of  France  and
individual departments are available publicly, and contain both quantitative and qualitative data
on the subset of departments audited. Importantly, the manner in which this subset was selected
for audit is not known, and it is likely not random. In Appendix section 7.3., I document that
there  is  a  high  degree  of  observational  similarity  between  the  audited  and  the  non-audited
departments.
The most  interesting  quantitative  data  gathered  by the  Audit  Court  concerns  the  number  of
sanctions pronounced against beneficiaries. This provides an alternative measure of sanction use,
which was also tapped in the CAF data analyzed above. While the distinction between different
types of sanctions is not consistently maintained in the data, and observations for many years are
not  available,  one  can  get  an  overall  estimate  of  the  sanctioning  intensity  of  departmental
bureaucracies  by  averaging  sanction  rates  for  the  years  available  and  dividing  them by the
average number of beneficiaries. This results in the average frequency of sanctions per recipient
per year. I use the average sanctioning intensity between the years 2004 and 2007, since they
correspond to a term of the President of the department council.
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Putting these figures in relation to the partisanship of departmental executives reveals a strong
positive correlation between the conservatism of departmental executives and the sanctioning
intensity of local bureaucracies, depicted in Figure 8. While there are practically no sanctions in
departments  governed  by the  French Communist  Party,  the  average  sanctioning  intensity  in
departments  governed  by  the  most  conservative  parties  is  about  7%.  Regression  results,
displayed  in  Table  3,  show that  the  difference  is  statistically  significant  even  in  this  small
sample. Adding control variables increases the point estimate and standard errors. Conversely,
the budgetary situation does not appear to be correlated with sanctioning intensity at all in the
Audit Court data.
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Figure  8:  Average  yearly  sanctioning  rate  between  2004  and  2007,  by
partisanship of the departmental executive (higher values on the X axis indicate
more conservative parties).
Recall that in the CAF data analyzed above, the finding was the inverse: changes in sanctions, as
reported by CAF managers, appeared to be unrelated to partisanship, but strongly related to the
budgetary situation. What might explain this divergence? 
On the one hand, the CAF measure taps pre-/post-reform changes in sanctions while the Audit
Court measured post-reform sanctioning levels. At some level it is therefore not surprising that
the findings are different. Correlations in the cross-section might be driven by fixed attributes of
departments; analyses of changes net out these department fixed effects and arguably lead to
more credible inferences. To the extent that the CAF survey measure succeeds in absorbing the
department fixed effect in sanction use, analyses based on CAF data are therefore more credible.
On the  other  hand,  the  Audit  Court  sanctioning measure  is  much less  coarse than  the  CAF
measure,  providing  administrative  data  on  actual  sanction  density  where  it  is  available  as
opposed to a simple distinction between stable, increasing and decreasing sanctions. This would
make the Audit  Court measure seem preferable,  especially if one is less confident about the
ability  of  the  survey instrument  to  net  out  the  department  fixed  effect.  I  conclude  that  the
evidence in favor of budgetary considerations in sanction use is stronger than that in favor of
partisan considerations, but both data sources come with their advantages and disadvantages.
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Besides  sanctioning  data,  the  Audit  Court  reports  are  also  noteworthy  for  the  qualitative
information they contain on decision-making within the local bureaucracy. The contrast between
RMI implementation  in  two departments  in  the  Paris  region offered  by  the  audit  reports  is
especially illustrating. Both Seine Saint Denis, an impoverished department in the northeast of
Paris  with  a  long  legacy  of  communist  local  government,  and  Yvelines,  one  of  the  richest
departments in France and governed by a succession of conservative parties, were subjects to
audits by the Audit Court. In both cases, local administrations used, and in the opinion of the
Court, overused their latitude in implementation, but in opposite directions.
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Table 3: Regression of average sanctioning rate per recipient (from Audit Court) on
budgetary situation and partisanship indicator, with and without controls.
In Seine Saint-Denis,  the Court observed that the department  was not implementing the law
requiring departments to monitor insertion contracts and suspending individuals that were to be
found in violation with them. As evidence, the report cites two internal papers circulated in the
local bureaucracy. One from 2003 notes the “drift which could ensue after the decentralization
reform in the context of ever-toughening budgetary requirements which could lead to systematic
campaigns to suspend the benefits to beneficiaries without insertion contract or which do not
follow every letter of such contract.  For the department of Seine Saint-Denis, adopting these
positions is out of the question. [emphasis added]” (Cour des Comptes (2011b), p.11). 
The second internal position paper cited in the Audit Court report dates from 2006 and elaborates
further  on the position  of  the  department  with  regards  to  sanctions.  According to  the Court
report, “after evoking the obligation of the department to offer every beneficiary an integration
contract,  the  [department  bureaucracy's]  paper  explains  that  the  establishment  of  a  “general
obligation to sign an integration contract” is excluded, since these contracts are “senseless and
disconnected from the needs of the beneficiaries of public services”. In conclusion, the paper
excludes deleting benefit recipients from the rolls in order to reduce their flow” (ibid., p.12).
Until 2007, not a single sanction was pronounced in Seine Saint-Denis. When the department
slowly  began  pronouncing  sanctions  afterwards,  it  underlined  its  desire  for  a  preventative
approach  using  warning  letters  instead  of  direct  sanctions  and,  vis-à-vis  the  Audit  Court,
remarked that information technology problems made it difficult to know which beneficiaries
had signed an integration contract, impeding sanctioning.
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Such problems did not seem to hinder the Yvelines department, on the other side of Paris, from
pursuing a severely punitive sanctioning policy. As the Audit Court report notes, the department
completely changed its local decision-making structure in response to decentralization (Cour des
Comptes  (2011c),  p.  8).  All  local  offices  that  had been previously tasked with pronouncing
sanctions were deprived of this right, and a new office was created that maintained the sole
prerogative over all sanctions in the department. As the report notes, this new office “pronounced
almost 1000 permanent deletions from the welfare rolls in 2005, 989 in 2006 and 878 in 2005”
(ibid.). The Audit Court held in its assessment that these steps were incompatible with the law,
and the sanctioning powers were given back to the pre-existing local offices in 2008. As the
court notes, still  in 2008, the internal yearly integration plan for the department contained an
“action  sheet”  entitled  “Simplify  the suspension procedure  for  RMI recipients  related  to  the
integration contract” (ibid.).
It  is  difficult  to  causally  trace  these  two  decisions  back  to  the  political  partisanship  of  the
decision-makers  in  departments  in  the  years  following  decentralization.  However,  what  the
reports show quite strikingly is that, despite the same law governing the RMI in all of France, the
reality “on the ground” was different for recipients in locales that are less than an hour away
from each other  by car,  and that  they were different  for reasons that  local  actors  could and
actively sought to influence. 
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4.4. Integration spending data
Next, I consider the effects of decentralization on the RMI’s integration programs using spending
data compiled from reports issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Spending figures are yearly
aggregates in constant Euros at the department level. Since the bulk of this spending is directed
at  labor  market  and  professional  integration,  (i.e.  on  training  and  retraining  programs  and
subsidized employment), I interpret spending as a measure of labor market integration effort. As
I show in Appendix section 7.4., this interpretation is substantiated by more disaggregated data
distinguishing labor market and social integration spending, which is available for a subset of
departments from Audit Court reports. 
In looking at the spending patterns, it is worth keeping in mind that the reform was in no small
part  designed  to  increase  departmental  integration  efforts  by  giving  departments  stronger
incentives to make recipients successful in the labor market. However, the reform also entailed
the  elimination  of  a  minimum  spending  requirement  on  integration  based  on  the  argument
advanced  by departments  that  this  requirement  would  be  unnecessary  once  incentives  were
correctly aligned. Therefore, the effect of decentralization on spending is a priori unclear. 
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As  Figure  9  shows,  the  total  level  of  spending  stayed  on  its  positive  trend  from the  pre-
decentralization  era  after  2004,  without  any notable  acceleration  or  slowdown.  However,  as
Figure 10 shows, the stability in overall spending levels masks a significant increase in regional
heterogeneity  of  spending  efforts  that  ensued  in  2004  and  after  (Poutingon  (2012)).  After
variation  in  integration  effort  between  departments  was  slowly  declining  since  1996,  the
coefficient of variation in per-capita spending went from about 0.2 to about 0.45 within only four
years following decentralization.  Thus, although overall integration efforts did not change from
a national perspective, the integration efforts directed at recipients depended much more on their
place of residence than they previously had. 
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Figure 9: Total spending on integration of RMI recipients in constant Euros
(Interrupted Time Series Analysis Graph).
 
How is this variation related to the local political environment in departments? I first test the
hypothesis that the budgetary situation affected spending decisions following decentralization.
To this end, Figure 11 displays a lowess estimate of yearly changes in per-capita integration
expenditure  in  relatively rich (gold)  and poor  (grey)  departments.  As the  graph shows,  pre-
reform trends in integration spending were highly similar between rich and poor departments
before 2004, but began to diverge notably after the reform. Departments with stronger budgets
began to spend more per capita following the reform, leading to significant variation in policy
effort by 2008. This divergence is of substantively important magnitude: while the richer half of
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Figure  10:  The  coefficient  of  variation  of  per-capita  integration  spending,
across departments (Interrupted Time Series Analysis Graph).
departments actually spent slightly less on integration per capita than poor ones in 2003, they
spent 34% more by 2008 (1049 vs. 779 Euros per recipient per year). 
But the divergence in integration efforts  is also related to the political  make-up of the local
governments that began making independent and unrestricted decisions about integration budgets
in 2004.  Figure 12 shows that while there were no partisan differences before decentralization,
conservative executives appear to have increased per-capita spending on integration following
the reform relative to left-wing ones.
43
Figure  11:  Year-on-year  changes  in  per-recipient  integration  spending,  in
departments with strong (gold) and weak (grey) budgets (cut at the median).
Lowess estimate, observations jittered to make distribution visible.
To  demonstrate  the  role  of  decentralization  in  this  partisan  divergence,  Figure  13  plots
integration spending against partisanship before (2003) and after (2008) decentralization. While
there was no relationship between partisanship and integration efforts in 2003, conservatively
governed departments (higher values on partisan scale) spent significantly more on integration
by the end of the observation period in 2008.10
10 It  should be noted that  budget  situation and department  partisanship are not at  all  correlated  in the sample
(Pearson’s  R of 0.01);  the two results about  budgetary situations and partisan orientations are therefore  not
mirror images of the same underlying correlation. 
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Figure  12:  Year-on-year  changes  in  per-recipient  integration  spending,  in
departments  with  left-wing  (red)  and  right-wing  (blue)  executives.  Lowess
estimate, observations jittered to make distribution visible.
To more rigorously assess the role of these two factors in the integration spending divergence, I
run regression models  of yearly differences  in integration  spending on explanatory variables
including year fixed effects, with and without additional control variables. The main independent
variables of interest are the interaction of a post-reform dummy with the partisanship variable
and the budget variable. Since partisanship varies over time, I can also control for partisanship
separately (Column 2). As Table 4 displays, the budget variable is positive and significant in all
specifications.  However,  the  coefficient  on  partisan  orientation,  while  significantly  different
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Figure  13:  Integration  spending  per  capita  by  department  and  partisan
orientation in 2003 (light grey, circles and fine dashed  line) and 2008 (black,
crosses  and long-dashed  line).  Higher  values   on  the  X axis  indicate  more
conservative departmental executives. Lowess estimate, observations jittered to
make distribution visible.
from zero in the simplest specification, is slightly attenuated, and its standard error increases,
when adding control variables.
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Table 4: Regression of yearly differences in integration spending per capita on partisanship and
budget indicators switched on after 2004 and control variables, per department, standard errors
clustered at the department level.
4.5. Survey of RMI recipients from Ministry of Social Affairs
Finally,  I  use  survey  data  to  assess  the  implementation  differences  engendered  by
decentralization  from the  perspective  of  recipients.11 The  survey  data  was  collected  by  the
research  directorate  of  the  French  Ministry  of  Social  Affairs  in  2003 and 2006,  with  some
overlapping questions allowing to look at changes within locales. Interviews were conducted by
drawing recipients from a national administrative dataset of individuals who had received the
RMI about 14 months before. This has the advantage that one can study not only RMI recipients,
but also former recipients who left the program in the months prior to the survey. Interviews
were conducted face-to-face during home visits lasting about an hour. 2,000 and 3,600 RMI
recipients were surveyed in 2003 and 2006, respectively. The clustered sampling strategy used is
quite  complex (see Appendix section 7.5.),  and results  in repeated  survey observations  from
about 40 departments in 2003 and 2006. 
I  use responses to questions tapping the dimensions of access,  conditionality and integration
effort asked in both surveys, as well as responses to some additional questions that were only
asked  in  2006.  All  analyses  use  department-level  means,  not  the  underlying  observations,
meaning standard errors are conservative. Throughout, I weigh by the number of respondents in
each department to reflect differences in variability of the estimated departmental means.
11 Although the survey data are noisy and imperfect, this is an important complement to the administrative data,
partly since the categories used in the CAF survey are inherently contested and political. For example, when
CAF administrators responded that integration benefits “improved from the standpoint of recipients”, it is far
from clear  whether  the recipients  concerned would agree  with this characterization,  a  complication that  the
technical-bureaucratic language used within the bureaucracy tends to obscure. That being said, the social context
of a survey of underprivileged benefit recipients by a government Ministry is also likely to generate artefacts of
this kind (Bourdieu (1984)).
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I first use the data from survey to display aggregate developments in four variables of interest:
the  fraction  of  RMI  recipients  (1)  working,  (2)  having  signed  an  integration  contract,  (3)
perceiving the RMI as devaluing, (4) leaving the RMI. 
The  share  of  respondents  having  signed  an  integration  contract  increased  quite  strongly
following decentralization,  showing that  at  least  on paper,  departments  indeed increased  the
focus  on  recipient’s  responsibility  and integration  goals.  The share  of  respondents  working,
feeling that the RMI was devaluing, and leaving the RMI all increased very slightly in the 3
years between the surveys. 
48
Figure 14: Fraction of RMI recipients working, having signed an integration
contract, perceiving policy as devaluing, and leaving the program, in 2003 and
2006, at department level, weighted by number of respondents
How did policy choices made in the departments affect substantive outcomes for recipients?
Recall the argument above that departments that were able to increase their integration budget
did so primarily with a view to advancing labor market integration,  often through subsidized
employment. If this is true, changes in integration budgets should correlate with changes in the
employment of recipients. The left panel of Figure 15 shows that this appears to be the case in
the  survey data;  integration  budget  expansion is  mostly  positively  related  to  changes  in  the
employment of recipients. However, as Tables 5 and 6 show, this relationship is not statistically
significant.
As regards the success of integration budget increases in generating exits from the RMI into the
labor market, the right-hand panel suggests that the departments that spent more on integration
did not experience more frequent exits from the RMI than departments that cut their integration
expenditure.  This  is  consistent  with  evaluations  showing  that  RMI  labor  market  integration




Figure 15: Change (2003-2006) in per-capita integration spending and change in fraction of
RMI recipients working (left) and change in fraction of respondents having left the RMI (right).
Differences at department level, weighted by respondents.
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Table 6: Regressions of 2003-2006 differences in survey indicators on integration spending
changes and budgetary and partisan variables with controls.
Table 5: Regressions of 2003-2006 differences in survey indicators on integration spending
changes and budgetary and partisan variables without controls.
Some very interesting questions pertaining to the perception of the RMI by recipients and the
implementation policy of the departments were only asked in 2006. I document results  from
these questions below, noting that results should be interpreted cautiously given the data’s purely
cross-sectional nature.
First,  respondents  were  asked  whether  they  were  threatened  with  sanctions  and  payment
suspensions, either due to their lack of a signed contract or due to their non-compliance with the
contract. This is a very direct measure of one aspect of the conditionality of RMI administration.
As Figure 16 shows, sanctioning threats as perceived by recipients appear strongly related both
with partisanship (with conservative department executives threatening more) and with budget
constraints (with more constrained department executives threatening more). 
52
A similar question posed in 2006 asks recipients whether they think that what is demanded of
them in terms of integration efforts and the integration contract in return for their receipt of the
RMI cash benefit  is  adequate  or exaggerated.  The pattern obtained is  similar  to  the one for
administration threats, with “exaggerated” demands more likely to be reported in conservatively
governed and financially constrained departments (Figure 17). Finally, I also use the survey data
to construct a measure of how frequently recipients visit the welfare office per year on average. 
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Figure 16: Partisanship of the department council President (left),  budgetary
situation of the department (right) and the share of recipients that report having
been  threatened  with  sanctions  during  their  interaction  with  social  policy
officers. Higher values on the Y axis indicate more frequent threats.
Table 7 presents the regression results for these cross-sectional data with and without control
variables. Without control variables, only the effect of partisanship on the share of recipients
reporting exaggerated demands from the administration is significant at conventional levels. This
point estimate is robust to adding controls. In estimations with controls, there is also evidence
that sanctions threats and excessive demands respond to budgetary conditions (in the expected
direction), and that office visits are more frequent in conservatively governed departments.
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Figure 17:  Partisanship of the department council President (left), budgetary
situation of the department (right) and the share of recipients that report that
demands  made  on  their  integration  efforts  by  the  administration  are
“exaggerated”. 
5. Conclusion 
This  study  presents  first  systematic  evidence  that  RMI  decentralization  led  to  the  kind  of
“subterranean”  policy changes described by Hacker (2004), with important repercussions for
recipients  and  the  degree  of  decommodification  achieved  by  the  policy,  but  also  for  the
homogeneity of policy towards citizens across the French territory.  
As the study shows, the implementation of the RMI became considerably more heterogeneous
across French departments, and some of these divergences are related to two key aspects of the
departmental  political  environment:  variations  in  budgetary  pressure  and  partisanship  of  the
departmental executive in charge of implementation. Specifically, I find evidence that changes in
control  regimes,  integration  demands  made  by authorities  and overall  access  to  benefits  are
associated with partisanship, and that integration spending is associated with the departmental
55
Table 7: Cross-sectional regressions of questions asked only in 2006, with and without controls.
budget's  condition.  The  findings  regarding  sanction  use  are  mixed,  with  the  more  credible
evidence suggesting that sanction use is related to budgetary conditions.
These findings have several implications for the study of social policy in advanced democracies.
First,  by documenting political  sources of variation in social  policy implementation within a
nominally  national  policy,  the  study  suggests  that  theoretical  explanations  frequently
hypothesized  to  account  for  policy  formulation  may  usefully  be  extended  to  questions  of
implementation. To clarify this argument it may be helpful to contrast the findings obtained here
with a literature on U.S. state politics which finds that state government partisanship predicts
how states design welfare programs that they have jurisdiction over. For example, Hill, Leighley
and  Hinton-Andersson  (1994)  show  that  states  with  higher  working-class  mobilization  and
Democratic political control tended to have higher AFDC benefits between 1978 and 1990. In a
similar  analysis,  Barilleaux  and  Miller  (1988)  found  partisan  differences  in  state  medicaid
policy.12 The  crucial  difference  between these  studies  and the present  one is  that  U.S.  state
legislators  are  legally  and  de  facto  able  to  set  policy  by  writing  laws  defining  eligibility
conditions and benefit amounts. By contrast, the variation in policy outcomes analyzed here is is
due  only  to  varying  implementation  of  the  very  same  program;  nevertheless,  the  patterns
obtained  are  broadly  similar  to  those  found  in  institutional  contexts  where  subnational
governments are formally enabled to define policy. 
12 Another  example  concerns  adoptions  of  Medicare  expansion  at  the  state  level  following  passage  of  the
Affordable Care Act, which are also known to follow a strongly partisan pattern.
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Second, the study sheds new light on the sources of political support for active labor market
policies. A growing body of research has begun investigating the political determinants of active
labor market policy (ALMP) effort, using data on the share of GDP spent on ALMP measures at
the country level. This literature has produced both evidence that left-wing governments spend
more on ALMP policy (Huo Nelson and Stephens  (2008)), and evidence that partisanship is not
associated with ALMP (Rueda (2006)). While the former set of authors claim that the significant
association shows that  left-wing governments  desire  high labor market  participation and low
unemployment, Rueda (2006) argues that social democratic parties have incentives to focus on
the  constituency  of  employed  and  protected  ‘insiders’  instead  of  spending  public  funds  on
outsiders, explaining his finding of no association. One of the major problems with interpreting
the  results  from  both  sets  of  studies  is  that  they  compare  aggregate  national  spending  on
programs  which  are  extremely  heterogeneous  (Bonoli  (2010)).  Another  perhaps  even  more
fundamental  problem is  that  spending on any budget  category,  like  ALMP,  is  mechanically
linked to spending on other  budget categories through the government’s budget constraint. Thus,
the finding of no partisan effects on ALMP in Rueda (2006) may be explained by his insider
outsider  theory  of  social  democracy  (“social  democrats  do  not  want  to  help  outsiders”),  or
alternatively it may be the case that social democrats choose to expand targeted cash benefits
rather than active labor market policies when in power (“social democrats do help outsiders, but
use other policies”). The decentralization of the RMI allows us to look in more detail at what
exactly  partisan  executives  do  when faced  with  trade-offs  between  different  components  of
social  policy.  The  evidence  described  above  suggests  that  in  the  French  case,  left-wing
executives  actually  decrease  spending  on  the  ALMP  component  of  the  RMI  following
decentralization  relative  to  right-wing  executives,  instead  focusing  on keeping  cash  benefits
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accessible. This is perfectly consistent with partisanship theory once trade-offs between multiple
policy goals are acknowledged, but shows that attempts to statistically explain cross-national
variation in “ALMP spending” without considering the alternative uses of public money can be
highly misleading.
Third, politically induced variation in implementation could help explain the puzzle of low and
regionally  heterogeneous  social  policy  take-up.  Research  examining  welfare  programs  in
different contexts has found somewhat surprisingly that very large fractions, often around 50%,
of the population eligible for benefits do not actually receive any (Currie (2004), van Oorschot
(1991)). Moreover, take-up rates are frequently very heterogeneous across regions and over time
within the same policy for reasons that are not fully understood (Blank and Card (1991)). The
present study suggests that by driving differentials in implementation, political and budgetary
factors may explain regional variation in take-up within the same policy.
One important caveat accompanying the findings is that it is difficult to empirically disentangle
the  various  aspects  of  local  political  environments.  For  example,  while  I  focus  on  the
partisanship of executives making implementation decisions, it is also plausible that executives
respond to the ideological position of their local constituencies when making these decisions.
Separating  out  these  two  mechanisms,  which  are  not  necessarily  mutually  exclusive,  is
empirically challenging in the context of this study given data constraints and the scarcity of
partisanship  switches  after  decentralization  reform.  Further  research  could  use  more
advantageous  institutional  settings  to  isolate  the  precise  mechanisms  linking  local  political
environments to implementation decisions. 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics.
7.2. Partisanship scores
To score the partisanship of parties, I use 2002 the economic policy dimension ratings from the
Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The few parties that are not rated by the dataset in 2002 receive, in
this order: 
1) their rating from the closest possible time period outside 2002
2) the rating of related parties, for parties that developed from or into other parties over time 
3) the average rating of parties of their leaning (left/right), for the few parties where 1 and 2 are
infeasible. 
The resulting ratings are: PCF 1.05, PS 4.08 , PRG 3.5, VERTS  2.75, RPR 5.92,  FN 6, UDF
5.92, MoDem 5.92, DL 8.17, UMP 7, MPF 7.5, PR 8.17, RPF 7.42, MDC 2.75, RPR 6.42, MRG
5.41, DVG 3.58, RDG 3.58, DVD 6.18, MLM 6.18, Mouvement libéral et modéré 6.18
7.3. Representativeness of the audited departments
Unfortunately,  no  information  could  be  obtained  about  the  procedure  by  which  the  17
departments audited by the Public  Audit  Court were selected.  In order to get a sense of the
representativeness  of  the  audited  departments,  I  conducted  simple  t-tests  on  political  and
economic covariates across the two samples. As can be seen in Table 9, audited departments do
at  not  appear  to  be  very  different  from  non-audited  departments  on  observed  covariates.
Importantly, divergences on the budget and partisan variables are substantively small. However,
standard errors are not small enough to rule out meaningful divergence in terms of the number of
recipients per department: auditors may plausibly have focused their efforts on departments with
a relatively large RMI population.
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7.4. The composition of integration spending
Throughout  the  paper,  I  use  aggregate  integration  spending  (per  recipient)  as  an  outcome
variable since more detailed data on spending subcomponents are not available. However, for the
subset  of  departments  investigated  by  the  Public  Audit  Court,  a  breakdown  of  integration
spending by function (labor market, social, housing, health) is available between 2004 and 2008.
These data come with the caveat that the allocation of spending on programs to these four areas
is somewhat arbitrary, a fact which is criticized in multiple Audit Court reports. Inspecting these
data suggests that the share of labor market integration spending in total integration spending is
high and rising over time, namely from an average of  58% in 2004 to an average of 71% in
2008. 
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Table 9: Observable differences between audited and non-audited departments.
More  importantly  since  I  interpret  increases  in  integration  spending  as  increased  effort  to
reintegrate recipients into the labor market, the data allows me to show that the share spent on
labor market integration does not move inversely to the overall amount spent on integration, a
possibility which would invalidate my interpretation. As Figure 18 shows, the opposite is the
case: changes in overall per-recipient integration spending are, if anything, weakly positively
correlated with the change in the share of this expenditure directed at labor market integration
according to the Audit Court Report. While this is based only on the non-random subsample of
departments that were audited, it strengthens the interpretation of spending changes as changes in
labor market integration effort.
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Figure 18: Change in share of integration spending on labor market integration
(between  2004  and  2008,  according  to  Audit  Court  data)  and  change  in
spending on integration (between 2003 and 2008, according to DREES data) at
the department level for the subset of departments audited by the Audit Court. 
7.5. Sampling strategy for DREES survey of RMI respondents
Summary translation of the survey sampling strategy employed by the DREES: 
The sampling strategy for the 2003 and 2006 surveys  involved three levels  of stratification:
departments, municipalities and individuals.
1. Departments were drawn from 5 strata: (1) the 8 departments of the Paris metro area, (2) the 6
departments  with  the  highest  total  numbers  of  benefit  recipients.  Of  these  two  strata,  all
departments were selected. Among (3) very urban departments with urbanization above 65% (4)
medium-urbanized  departments  with  urbanization  between  50%  and  65%  and  (5)  rural
departments with urbanization below 50%, 15 departments  were picked within each stratum,
proportionally to their size in terms of benefit recipients.
2.  Within  selected  departments,  municipalities  are  grouped in three strata:  (1)  an exhaustive
stratum of  the  four  largest  municipalities  in  terms  of  benefit  recipients  (all  four  largest  are
chosen). (2) Those cantons (sub-departmental districts) or fractions thereof classified as “urban”
by the INSEE (national statistical agency) (3) Those cantons or fractions thereof classified as
“rural” by the INSEE.
For each departments, 6 fractions of cantons are selected, proportionally to the number of benefit
recipients in them: the distribution of fractions of cantons between strata (2) and (3) varies with
their relative importance in each department. 
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Paris  is  treated  separately:  10  of  20  neighborhood  districts  (arrondissements)  are  chosen
randomly  with  probabilities  proportional  to  their  size  in  terms  of  the  number  of  benefit
recipients: there is no exhaustive stratum. 
3. Individuals are systematically sampled on the basis of a dataset sorted by age and gender,
within each commune or fraction of canton that is selected. 
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III. BUREAUCRATIC DISCRIMINATION IN GERMANY (WITH A. RINK)13
Abstract
A growing  experimental  literature  uses  response  rates  to  fictional  requests  to
measure  discrimination  against  ethnic  minorities.  This  paper  argues  that
restricting  attention  to  response  rates  can  lead  to  faulty  inferences  about
substantive  discrimination depending on how response dummies  are correlated
with other response characteristics. We illustrate the relevance of this problem by
means of a conjoint experiment among all German welfare offices, in which we
randomly varied five traits and designed requests to allow for a substantive coding
of response quality. We find that response rates are statistically indistinguishable
across treatment conditions. However, putative non-Germans receive responses of
significantly lower quality, potentially deterring them from applying for benefits.
We  also  find  observational  evidence  suggesting  that  discrimination  is  more
pronounced in welfare offices run by local governments than in those embedded
in the national bureaucracy. We discuss implications for the study of equality in
the public sphere.
13 Research for this paper was done jointly with Anselm Rink. We are grateful to Alex Coppock, Don Green, Jens
Hainmüller, and Macartan Humphreys for help and feedback during different stages of the project. Insightful
comments from seminar participants at WZB Berlin are also gratefully acknowledged. This study was approved
by Columbia University's Institutional Review Board (AAAO5013) and pre-registered at EGAP (20150122AA).
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1. Introduction 
The equal application of the law to all citizens is a cornerstone of democratic political systems.
Persistent findings of in-group favoritism, however, highlight that equality before the state does
not  arise  naturally  from interactions  of  democratically-minded  citizens  and state  officials;  it
requires  institutions  to produce and maintain  (Hewstone,  Rubin and Willis  (2002),  Jolls  and
Sunstein  (2006)).  A  long  line  of  scholarship  has  ascribed  modern  state  bureaucracies,
characterized by their routinized and impersonal decision-making procedures, a central role in
this process (Rothstein and Teorell (2008), Weber (2009), Rosanvallon (2011)). Yet, the extent
to which modern bureaucracies succeed in treating all citizens fairly and equally is a question of
significant debate.
A large body of social science research has produced convincing evidence that state officials
exhibit significant partiality in spheres including legal bureaucracy (Mustard (2001), Rachlinski,
Johnson, Wistrich and Guthrie (2009)), election administration (Atkeson, Bryant, Hall, Saunders
and Alvarez (2010), Cobb, Greiner and Quinn (2010)), and human services bureaucracy (Lipsky
(1980), Keiser, Mueser and Choi (2004)).14  In order to isolate the causal link between ethnicity
and  bureaucratic  behavior,  recent  scholarship  has  increasingly  employed  field  experiments.
Using fictitious information requests, studies have shown that putative members of historically
disadvantaged groups are less likely to receive a response from state officials in settings ranging
from U.S. states to South African and Chinese bureaucracies (Butler and Broockman (2011),
Distelhorst and Hou (2014), Giulietti, Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2015)). Related studies show that
in-group favoritism is present in both directions: white officials in both the United States and
14 A related but arguably distinct research agenda investigates discrimination on labor and housing markets and in
civil society (Fix and Struyk (1993), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Pager and Quillian (2005), Pager and
Shepherd (2008), Humphreys, Fang and Guess (2014)).
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South Africa are more likely to respond to requests from putative whites, while black politicians
favor putative blacks (Broockman (2013),  McClendon (forthcoming)). 
The present study questions how informative response rate differentials  are about substantive
discrimination.  Our  argument  is  straightforward.  The  quality  of  a  bureaucrat’s  response  is
inherently multidimensional — whether a response is received is only one dimension. Depending
on how the multiple dimensions of quality are correlated with one another, restricting attention to
response rates can produce misleading or outright false conclusions about discrimination. The
bias can work in different directions: ignoring the content of a response may lead researchers to
find  “false  null”  results  of  no  discrimination,  despite  the  fact  that  discrimination  is  in  fact
present.  This  occurs,  for  example,  when  a  minority  applicant  has  the  same  likelihood  of
receiving  a  response,  but  is  sent  emails  of  substantively  lower  quality.  Even  more
problematically, one group may receive more frequent but less helpful responses than another,
falsely leading researchers to conclude that this group is being treated favorably when attention
is restricted to response rates.
We illustrate the relevance of these considerations using a conjoint experiment involving all 408
German welfare offices. After pre-registering the design, hypotheses and measurement strategy
at  EGAP,  we  sent  fictional  requests  to  all  offices,  in  which  applicants  inquired  about  the
application process for cash benefits. The requests were designed to elicit responses that would
be interpretable in terms of their helpfulness to the applicants. We randomly varied five traits
including the putative requester’s ethnicity. 321 responses were received, implying a response
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rate of 78 percent. Importantly, the response rates were virtually identically distributed across the
treatment conditions.
However,  it  would  have  been  premature  to  conclude  that  no  discrimination  occurred.  In
assessing the quality of the answers, we find that putative non-Germans (Turks and Romanians)
received responses that were substantively inferior. Responses to non-Germans score 0.4 points
lower on our 5-point quality measure — a 21 percent decline. Specifically, non-Germans were
more  likely  to  receive  responses  stating  that  applying  for  cash  benefits  was  more
administratively  burdensome  than  it  is  according  to  national  policy.  The  results  hence
demonstrate that non-Germans are not treated equally by the German social policy bureaucracy,
though  in  dimensions  that  are  more  subtle  than  the  response/non-response  margin  typically
analyzed in correspondence trials.
We also  assess  the  degree  to  which  discrimination  relates  to  an  institutional  feature  of  the
German social  policy bureaucracy,  whereby a minority  of offices  is  run not  by the national
welfare  bureaucracy  but  by  local  governments.  Observational  evidence  indicates  that
discrimination is more pronounced in these types of welfare offices, suggesting that bureaucratic
centralization may be helpful in reducing inequality.
2. Multiple dimensions of discrimination
When applying for jobs, housing, or benefits, individuals prefer receiving a response to being
ignored. Based on this logic, a growing literature uses response rates in correspondence trials to
assess whether requesters of different backgrounds are being treated equally. In many cases, this
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empirical strategy is reasonable. When applying for a job, a callback signals employer interest.
Following an ostensibly similar logic, researchers interested in discrimination by state officials
have sent requests for information or help and adopted response rates as their primary outcome
measure.
There are at least three reasons for this decision. At the level of the individual request, it  is
plausible that any response is preferable to no response (though exceptions are conceivable).
Moreover, whether or not a response was received can be coded transparently, and with little
effort involved. Finally,  analyses of response rates do not face thorny missing data problems
since non-response is a well-defined outcome. Taken together, these factors make response rates
a simple and easily implementable measure of how willing state officials are to help applicants
of different backgrounds.
However, the helpfulness of replies received is likely to vary significantly. In the studies cited
above, Butler and Broockman (2011) sent emails in which citizens asked legislators for help in
signing up to vote, while Distelhorst and Hou (2014) sent emails in which citizens requested
information  about  a  basic  welfare program.  Even with such simple  requests,  many kinds  of
outcomes are possible, ranging from simple responses asking requesters to come to the office to
a detailed explanation of the program or procedure. Bureaucrats may even go so far as to solve
the problem raised by requesters entirely.
This  variation  in  response  quality  matters  for  the  substantive  question  of  whether  some
requesters receive better treatment than others. Good treatment is inherently multidimensional.
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However, this variation is not considered when restricting attention to response rates. To see this,
consider three stylized scenarios.
In the first scenario, assume that the probability of receiving a response is positively correlated
with its latent quality. Here, our concern reduces to a measurement error problem. Bureaucrats
are characterized by their “helpfulness”, which may or may not be a function of the ethnicity of
an applicant. Bureaucrats only respond to queries if their helpfulness exceeds a given threshold.
If a response is given, its quality is increasing in the bureaucrat’s helpfulness. If a subset of
bureaucrats  is more (or less) helpful to one ethnic group than another, this materializes as a
response rate differential  across the groups.  The fact that quality is not fully proxied by the
response  dummy,  then,  induces  measurement  error.  Importantly,  however,  differences  in
response rates are indicative of a helpfulness differential between ethnic groups for the average
bureaucrat. 
However,  suppose  in  a  second  scenario  that  bureaucrats  are  obligated  to  respond  to  every
incoming query. This could be the case, for example, if there is an effective monitoring system in
place and bureaucrats are held accountable by their  superiors. In this scenario response rates
would be 100 percent across the board and hence uncorrelated with the underlying helpfulness of
the bureaucrat. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that no discrimination takes place. Drafting
responses and doing the requisite research requires effort. Bureaucrats might well be less likely
to expend this effort when responding to one group rather than another. In a similar fashion,
bureaucrats might consider some groups undeserving of help, and may therefore be less likely to
write helpful answers (Van Oorschot (2006), Applebaum (2001)). To be plausible, this scenario
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requires response quality to be less easily monitored by the hierarchy than whether any response
is sent. This is likely to be the case given that the monitoring problem faced by a hierarchy is the
same faced by social scientists: to monitor quality, one would be required to read all messages,
while  monitoring  response  rates  only  requires  measuring  whether  an  email  was  sent.  Thus,
although an experiment would find identical response rates across groups, this  would  not be
indicative of equal treatment, possibly producing a misleading study result.
Finally,  consider  a  third scenario in  which  there are  two types  of bureaucrats:  “racists”  and
“white  guilt”  administrators.  “Racists”  only  respond  to  requests  from  putative  majority
requesters.  “White  guilt”  administrators  respond to  everyone,  but  put  extra  effort  into  their
responses to requesters from the minority group. In this scenario, minority requesters as a group
get fewer, but qualitatively superior responses than requesters from the majority group. Across
groups,  response  rates  and  response  quality  are  inversely  correlated.  In  this  situation,  a
correspondence trial restricting attention to response rates would yield measurable discrimination
effects.  However,  considering  the  divergence  in  response  rates  and  response  quality  across
groups, it would be difficult to determine which group is being discriminated against.
In  short,  focusing  exclusively  on  response  rates  in  correspondence  trials  may  be  a  mere
measurement imperfection without problematic implications for findings (scenario 1). However,
it may also lead to unwarranted or at least misleading findings of no discrimination (scenario 2)
or of discrimination (scenario 3). Many more scenarios are, of course, imaginable.
76
These arguments do not, in our view, render the literature on response rates obsolete. Its findings
are empirically credible, especially when interpreted narrowly: as results about response rates.
However,  at  a minimum,  additional  research assessing the quality dimension of bureaucratic
responsiveness in correspondence trials seems warranted. 
3. Experimental design
3.1. Setting 
To move the study of discrimination beyond response rates, the present paper focuses on the
German bureaucracy. The German case exhibits two main features that render it of particular
interest in this context.
First,  after  a  history  of  authoritarianism  and  genocide  in  the  20th  century,  social  norms
surrounding tolerance are by many accounts very strong in contemporary Germany (Art (2005)).
Discrimination based on race, ethnic origin or religion is outlawed according to the “General
Equal  Treatment  Law”  (Allgemeines  Gleichbehandlungsgesetz).  Moreover,  the  German
bureaucracy is widely considered to be highly professional and effective, owing partly to Max
Weber’s influential scholarship on bureaucratic institutions in Prussia (Mayntz (1965)). Whether
these background conditions lead to impartial  bureaucratic behavior is therefore of particular
interest.
Second,  contemporary  Germany is  increasingly  ethnically  diverse.  Almost  20 percent  of  the
population are either of non-German nationality or have a migrant background (i.e. at least one
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migrant parent) according to the 2011 Census. The recent influx of immigrants from countries
outside of the European Union will  further  increase the diversity of the resident population.
There  is  a  lively  academic  debate  about  the  consequences  of  this  diversity  and the  role  of
prejudice in the German public sphere. On the one hand, mainstream political discourse has been
increasingly  accommodating  over  the  past  decades.  Notably,  the  political  interpretation  of
immigration as a short-term phenomenon has given way to a narrative of Germany as a “country
of immigrants”. Moreover, antiprejudice norms are judged to be quite strong by many observers
(Blinder,  Ford  and  Ivarsflaten  (2013)).  On  the  other  hand,  survey  research  shows  that  a
significant fraction of the German population exhibit xenophobic biases. Krumpal (2012) shows
that 27 percent of survey respondents agree that “Germany is dangerously swamped by foreign
influences”.  This  rate  increases  to  35  percent  when  a  randomized  response  technique  is
employed  to elicit  truthful  reporting.  Consistent  with this  finding,  experimental  research the
German labor and housing markets has found that immigrants face significant hurdles to equality
(Kaas and Manger (2012), Schmid (2015)).
To our knowledge, no study has systematically examined discrimination against non-Germans by
the German welfare state. This is surprising given that the receipt of welfare benefits by non-
Germans is a politically salient and contested issue. As in other European countries, parties have
campaigned on a platform of reducing welfare use by non-Germans, insinuating that migration is
driven primarily by a desire to receive cash benefits (Thränhardt (1995), Spiegel (2014)).
Our study focuses on a component of the German welfare state that is particularly contested: the
system of means-tested cash benefits frequently dubbed Hartz 4. These benefits, which are not
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contingent on previous contributions to the welfare system, are collected by 6 million individuals
(about 7 percent of the population) and constitute the backbone of the German social safety net.
In 2014, 1 out of 6 million recipients were non-German nationals.15 Participating households
receive,  on  average,  735  Euros  ($840)  per  month  in  benefits.  In  order  to  receive  benefits,
individuals  have  to  present  themselves  at  local  welfare  offices  called  Jobcenters to  apply.
Continued receipt  of benefits  is  conditional  on compliance with rules designed to encourage
labor market integration.
News reports have repeatedly suggested that non-Germans face discrimination in welfare offices:
offices have inter alia been accused of withholding application documents from non-German
nationals  (Deutsche Welle  (2014)).  A study of three Berlin-area welfare offices by a private
consulting company suggests that migrant applicants are singled out by more than 45 percent of
welfare office staff as the most “problematic” group of clients (Stern, Wecking and Reinecke
(2008)).  At the same time,  admittedly coarse aggregate data on benefit  take-up rates  do not
suggest that eligible non-Germans are less likely to receive benefits than eligible Germans, as
one  might  expect  if  welfare  offices  systematically  discriminated  against  non-Germans
(Castronova, Kayser, Frick and Wagner (2001), Bruckmeier and Wiemers (2012)). This finding
of  no  take-up  differential  between  natives  and  immigrants  contrast  with  studies  from other
countries including the U.S., which have found immigrants to be less likely to take up benefits
conditional on eligibility (Currie (2004)).
15 The largest groups are Turkish (350,000), Polish (69,000), Italian (62,000) and Iraqi (51,000) nationals.
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3.2. Quality measure
In  order  to  systematically  study response  quality,  responses  elicited  by the  request  must  be
interpretable with little ambiguity and high transparency.16 After initial research, we decided to
base our instrument on two questions that measure the applicant’s trustworthiness in the eyes of
bureaucrats, and the effort bureaucrats are willing to expend to respond to the question.17
The first question was designed to induce the bureaucrat to state a legal fact about the application
process to the applicant. Specifically, the applicant — having stated that he/she lives in a shared
apartment with co-tenants who are his/her friends — asked whether paperwork from his/her co-
tenants  was  required  when  submitting  an  application  for  benefits.  Importantly,  national
legislation clearly states that documents about non-relatives who are co-tenants do not have to be
submitted. Yet, applicants have an incentive to hide family or partner relationships with other
members  of  their  households  to  receive  additional  benefits.  When  preparing  an  application,
bureaucrats therefore have to trust that the information applicants provide is accurate. The given
answer can thus be interpreted as a signal about whether the bureaucrat deems the applicant
trustworthy.
The second question was designed to measure the bureaucrat’s effort. Specifically, the applicant
asked  what  kind  of  paperwork  was  required  in  order  to  apply  for  benefits.  The  documents
16 In the pre-registration document, we postulated the following guideline for our instrument: “1. The request must
induce meaningful  variation within responses.  Simple response  rates,  which are  a  common outcome in the
existing literature, are problematic as the response margin may be the quality of the help given. For example, if a
bureaucratic organization is legally bound to respond to every inquiry received, but individual case workers are
prejudiced against minorities, this could lead to them answering all requests but treating them differentially in
terms of the helpfulness of the response, or in terms of encouraging the applicant to apply. 2. The request must
be realistic in order to measure the way that everyday requests are handled by the offices. 3. The request must be
relatively simple to answer in order to avoid wasting the time of bureaucrats.”
17 To  ensure  that  the  putative  applicants  would  actually  be  eligible  for  benefits,  rather  than  first  receiving
contributory  unemployment  insurance,  we  included  a  statement  suggesting  that  the  applicant  had  worked
independently before, but that he/she had had to stop their independent activity because of a lack of business.
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required  can  vary  to  some  degree  according  to  individual  circumstances.  Nevertheless,  all
applicants are required to produce a rental contract, documents on the non-rental cost of housing
(heating,  water,  electricity  bills,  etc.),  bank statements,  their  social  security  certificate,  their
health insurance card, proof of income for the past three months, as well as statements relating to
ownership of assets. The more items bureaucrats list in response to this question, the more they
prepare the applicant for the application process.
3.3. Treatment 
To  study  the  effects  of  ethnicity  and  other  request  characteristics  on  response  quality,  the
instrument randomly varied five aspects of the request:  the applicant’s  ethnicity,  gender, and
skill level, as well as the formality of the email and whether the applicant mentioned a lawyer.
The  treatments  and instruments  are  summarized  in  Table  1.  Interacting  these  characteristics
yields 48 unique types of requests, which were randomly assigned to all welfare offices.
The key treatment of interest,  A, varies the applicant’s putative ethnicity among three groups:
Germans, Turks and Romanians. Turks represent the largest group of immigrants in Germany
(Schönwälder (2013), p. 637) and have long been the focus of the discourse on immigration and
discrimination.  Romanian  migrants  have  only  become  the  subject  of  political  debate  more
recently when complete labor force mobility between Romania (and Bulgaria) and Germany took
effect in January 2014. Since then — despite total migration from Romania being modest —
politicians and media pundits have discussed widespread “poverty migration”. Romanians have
therefore come under discriminatory pressure, including accusations of “welfare cheating”.
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The second treatment, B, varies the applicant’s gender, resulting in six aliases in total. We used
lists of common names in Germany and in Romania, as well as among Turks in Germany, to find
aliases that are reasonably similar to each other while clearly signaling ethnicity.18
The third treatment, C, varies the applicant’s putative skill level. Here, we varied the profession
the applicant claims to have practiced before. We chose two professions which are frequently
exercised independently and relatively gender-balanced empirically. Our choice of the skilled job
was physiotherapist, which requires extensive skills training and a certificate, while our choice of
the unskilled job was a cleaning person.
The fourth treatment, D, varies the formality of the request. To this end, we sent out two versions
of the email.  The first  email  contained no mistakes  and was written in a relatively accurate
18 Note that we were unable to obtain a reliable source of information documenting the exact frequency of these
names in Germany.
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Table 1: Treatment instruments.
formal and distant tone. Our intention was to represent the style and structure that an applicant
with an average educational background would use. The second version decreased the level of
formality  by adding grammatical  mistakes,  as  well  as  spelling  and capitalization  errors,  and
reducing the formality of the greeting. 19
For the final treatment,  E, we experimented with casually mentioning a lawyer. The treatment
was motivated by the fact that most applicants have very little understanding of the application
process  and their  legal  rights,  weakening their  position  vis-à-vis  the bureaucracy.  Moreover,
there is anecdotal evidence that bureaucratic behavior in German welfare offices changes in the
physical presence of external counsel.
3.4. Hypotheses
We  spelled  out  our  main  hypotheses  in  the  pre-registration  document  which  we  briefly
summarize here. The hypotheses were inspired by the expectation that bureaucrats would treat
non-Germans less favorably, but that this effect would be mitigated for certain groups. We also
registered hypotheses for our other treatments and some observational correlations, the latter of
which are not discussed in this paper.
Besides a general tendency of discrimination against non-Germans, we expected foreigners to be
treated differently based on their origin: since recent public discourse made immigration from
Romania highly salient and connected it explicitly to welfare use, we expected Romanians to be
treated less favorably than Turks (BBC (2014)).
19 The different versions of the instrument are reproduced in Appendix section 7.3.
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 Hypothesis 1: Bureaucrats treat German aliases more favorably than Turkish aliases, and
Turkish aliases more favorably than Romanian aliases
Given discrimination against females in the German labor market (Diekmann, Engelhardt and
Hartmann (1993)), labor market integration for women might be more difficult. We therefore
hypothesized  that  bureaucrats  would  focus  their  efforts  on  males,  leading  to  higher
discrimination for females.
 Hypothesis 2: Bureaucrats treat male applicants more favorably than female applicants
We expected  the  skills  treatment  to  have  an effect  because  skills  are  directly  related  to  the
likelihood of success in the integration programs mandated by Hartz IV, and hence to the length
of participation in the welfare program. Since welfare offices are assessed based on their success
in re-integrating applicants into the job market, it is typically rational for bureaucrats to focus
their efforts on the segment of recipients that are more skilled and educated (Heckman, Heinrich 
and Smith (1997)).
 Hypothesis 3: Bureaucrats treat skilled applicants more favorably than unskilled
Besides occupational skills, the level of formality of the request is also a strong signal of basic
language and writing skills, which we expected to affect responses in a similar manner.
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 Hypothesis  4:  Bureaucrats  treat  applicants  with  formal  requests  more  favorably  than
those with informal requests
Although the casual mentioning of a lawyer is only a very slight hint that an applicant might be
more  informed  about  the  application  process  and  knowledgeable  about  their  rights,  we
hypothesized that this intervention would have a positive effect on response quality.
 Hypothesis  5: Bureaucrats treat applicants that mention a lawyer  more favorably than
those that do not
In addition, exploiting the conjoint nature of the trial, we study how discrimination against non-
Germans relates to other non-ethnic characteristics of the requests. This is important because it
allows  us  to  investigate  whether  bureaucrats  discriminate  simply  because  they  dislike  non-
Germans  (taste-based  discrimination),  or  because  they  use  ethnicity  cues  to  infer  other
information  about  applicants  (statistical  discrimination)  (Becker  (1957),  Phelps  (1972)).  If
discrimination against non-Germans were attenuated for those requests displaying higher skills
and  knowledge  relative  to  other  requests,  this  would  be  considered  evidence  of  statistical
discrimination.
 Hypothesis 6: Discrimination against foreign-sounding names will be less pronounced for
respondents which are more skilled, mention a lawyer, or write more formal requests
85
As described above,  a particular  feature of the welfare offices  is  that  some of them are run
entirely by local governments (Optionskommunen), while the rest are under the umbrella of the
national  welfare  agency  and  run  in  conjunction  with  local  governments.  The  choice  of
organizational form has been at the discretion of local governments since 2005. About a quarter
of agencies are now fully independent. As previous literature suggests, decentralization increases
the room for discretion of local bureaucrats, heightening the probability that any potential biases
among bureaucrats influence service delivery (Fording, Soss and Schram (2011)).
 Hypothesis 7: Discrimination against foreign-sounding names will be larger in locally-
organized welfare offices, and the variance of substantive quality will be larger in them.
Finally, we hypothesized that the formality of requests would affect the formality of responses.
However, as we discuss in the pre-registration document, formality is not a useful indicator of
response quality since it is unclear whether formal language is a desideratum for applicants; it
may both express respect and project professionalism, but also work as a deterrent. Therefore,
we were primarily interested in whether responses mirrored the requests that were sent in terms
of their formality.
 Hypothesis 8: Correspondence formality will be higher in the “formal” condition. Non-
Germans will receive less formal responses.
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3.5 Sample and protocol
Our units of observation are welfare office districts,  of which there were 408 in early 2015.
Within  a welfare office district,  there is  typically  one main  office  and multiple  subbranches
spread throughout the district.  All email  addresses were manually collected directly from the
districts’ websites. Since 2005, local governments can choose to run the welfare bureaucracy
independently (Hassel and Schiller (2008)) — an option 105 districts made use of in early 2015.
As can be seen in Figure 1, these centralized and independent agencies are fairly evenly spread
across Germany though there are some differences between federal states.
Before rolling out the experiment, a pre-test was conducted to ensure that the requests elicited
meaningful responses. The pre-test was performed using 24 randomly sampled offices, which
received the email in November 2014. The pre-test induced one small change in the instrument;
the Turkish female name was changed from Aylin to Ayse because two bureaucrats had mistaken
the alias for a male.20 The main wave of the experiment was implemented in January 2015, when
the requests  where sent to the remaining 384 welfare offices.  Randomization was performed
blocking on whether agencies are part of the national bureaucracy or managed independently to
reduce variability. 
Originally,  a smaller second wave of the experiment was scheduled to be implemented a few
weeks later. It would have involved emails to the subbranches in the 61 districts where multiple
emails were available. However, upon reading the responses of the main wave, we noted that
emails  had  occasionally  been  internally  forwarded  among  bureaucrats  within  districts.  This
meant that sending a similar request would have considerably increased the risk of detection. The
20 Table 8 shows that the results are not affected when excluding the pre-test sample.
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protocol  was  therefore  changed  —  a  decision  made  before  any  outcomes  were  coded  or
analyzed.
3.6. Ethical considerations
At this point, two ethical concerns merit discussion. First is the study’s use of deception vis-à-vis
welfare offices. While we believe that the use of deception should be avoided whenever possible,
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Figure  1:  Location  of  the  408  employment  agencies
(Jobcenter).  Hollow  circles  mark  offices   integrated  in  the
national bureaucracy, solid circles mark offices run locally.
working with real requests did not appear feasible in this context: The German/foreigner cue is
difficult  to manipulate,  and,  more importantly,  manipulating real  cases may have deleterious
consequences for actual applicants.
The second issue is the study’s diversionary effect on the bureaucrats in the welfare offices:
instead  of  responding  to  fictional  queries,  officials  could  have  helped  actual  applicants.  As
explained  below,  we  tried  to  find  the  shortest  and  simplest  request  that  would  still  elicit
meaningful variation in responses. The correct responses to the questions we asked are posted in
the FAQ section of the national  welfare agency’s  website,  highlighting the simplicity  of the
request.
3.7. Coding of outcome variables
As outlined in the pre-registration document, we recorded a variety of discrimination measures
grouped  into  main  outcomes  and other  outcomes,  described in  Section  3.8.  The three  main
outcome measures are the substantive quality,  the response dummy, and the friendliness of a
given response, which we discuss in turn.
First and most importantly, we constructed a substantive quality variable based on whether the
two questions contained in the request were answered appropriately (Answer question 1, and
Answer question 2). The coding of this measure requires some discussion given its significance
for the study. As detailed in the pre-registration document, for each of the two questions, we
gave either no points for no answer or no acknowledgement of the question, one point for a
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partial response, and two points for the correct response. The substantive quality measure is the
sum of these two measures.
Regarding the question on the list of documents, two points were given if the bureaucrat listed at
least three  specific documents of those outlined above. One point was given if the bureaucrat
listed one or two documents; this was typically to acknowledge the need for an ID document
when visiting the welfare office. No point was given if the question was not addressed or if no
single document was indicated.
Regarding the question about co-tenants’ documentation, two points were given if the question
was answered correctly, informing the applicant that no personal documents are required of the
co-tenants. One point was given if the question was acknowledged and partially responded to.
No points were given if the question was not addressed. One point was deducted in case the
question was answered incorrectly,  for example,  by stating that  documents  of co-tenants are
generally necessary (this occurred four times).
The two authors coded the emails independently and blindly.  To this end, before any coding
began, all emails were completely anonymized, removing any information that would have made
it possible to infer an agency’s treatment status. Overall, the two sets of codings yield a Pearson
correlation coefficient of 0.974 for the question about the list of documents, and 0.989 for the
question about co-tenants’ documentation.  There were eight instances of disagreement on the
former question and seven on the latter. In the empirical section, we use the average of both
coders.
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The second main outcome is a simple response dummy, where automatic emails from a server
are excluded. The third main outcome is the friendliness of emails, coded subjectively by both
coders, on a 7-point scale. On these measures, owing to the flexibility of the concept, inter-coder
reliability was considerably lower, with Pearson’s R of 0.22.
Besides these three main outcomes,  we also recorded secondary outcome measures including
whether the response contained a formal greeting or goodbye, or both; the number of spelling
mistakes; the number of grammatical and punctuation mistakes; whether the emails had a formal
tone (coded subjectively by both coders on a 7-point scale, correlated at only 0.16); the length of
the email; and the time it took bureaucrats to respond.
3.8. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the study. The overall response rate was 78 percent
— an exceptionally high rate for this type of study.21 Importantly, this allows us to perform our
analyses of response quality on a large sample of responses. The average response time was 39
hours and responses were an average of 616 characters in length, excluding signatures.
Regarding the substantive questions, the average coding of the first question was 0.95 points
(Answer  question  1  average),  while  the  average  for  the  second question  was  0.69  (Answer
question 2 average). We combined the scores for both questions to a comprehensive response
quality index (Response quality average), which is our primary outcome of interest.22
21 For comparison, Butler and Broockman (2011) received a response in 57 percent of all cases, and Distelhorst and
Hou (2014) found a 37 percent response rate.
22 Note that in the EGAP pre-registration document, we defined a quality variable that would take the value 0 if no
response was received, value 1 if any response was received, and extra points for substantive answers to the
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questions. This variable would allow one to make comparisons across treatment conditions even if both response
rates  and  quality  varied.  However,  since  response  rates  were  highly  similar  across  treatment  conditions,
differential non-response is not a concern. The analyses thus exclusively focus on the responses received. This
has the advantage of not imposing any form of weighting of response rates versus quality. As detailed in Table
17, implementing our pre-registered coding does not change results appreciably.
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Table 2: Pre-treatment covariates and outcomes.
Of all  responses,  94  percent  contained  a  formal  greeting  (Formal  greeting)  and  94  percent
contained  a  formal  goodbye  (Formal  goodbye).  On  average,  responses  contained  0.2  typos
(Typos) and 1.2 grammatical mistakes including punctuation (Mistakes).
Our subjective coding of a given email’s tone was done on a scale from 1 (very unfriendly) to 7
(very friendly),  captured in the variables  Friendliness coder 1 and  Friendliness coder 2. The
average score of both coders was 4.1 (i.e., the emails were friendly on average;  Friendliness
average). However, as mentioned above, correlations between coders were quite low. Finally,
regarding response formality, the average score given was also 4.1 (Formality average).
In addition to our outcome variables, Table 2 also reports descriptive statistics for the five pre-
treatment covariates at the agency level. The variables above the dotted line were pre-registered,
the ones below were not pre-registered and are thus not used in the empirical analysis. First, we
obtained  the  unemployment  rate  at  the  welfare  office  district  level  from  official  records
(Unemployment;  average of 7 percent).  Second, we indicate which of the 16 German federal
states the agency is located in to estimate state fixed effects (State). Third, we report whether the
agency is independently organized (Independent), which 26 percent of the sample are. Fourth,
Migrant  measures  the  percentage  of  citizens  with  immigration  backgrounds  in  each  district
according to the 2011 Census.23 Since these citizens are concentrated in more populous districts,
their average share among the residents is lower at the level of districts (17 percent) than at the
population  level.  Fifth,  we  recorded  the  fraction  of  successful  appeals  and  lawsuits  against
23 In merging these data to our dataset, we averaged over counties for the few welfare districts containing multiple
counties. We were also forced to impute the share of residents with an immigration background in the state of
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where there was no data on migrant shares in 9 districts. We imputed the missing
data  with  the  (known)  mean  of  the  state,  which  is  very  low at  3.7  percent  (lowest  decile  in  the  national
distribution).
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agency decisions  (Appeals)  from national  welfare  agency databases.  We wanted  to  use  this
variable as a proxy for the legal quality of decision-making but did not realize at the time of pre-
registration  that  it  contains  missing  values  in  59  districts  (15  percent  of  observations).  We
therefore decided not to include this variable in the benchmark empirical analyses, though we
conduct a detailed analysis including this variable in Appendix Tables 15 and 16.
Aside from these five pre-registered control variables, we report statistics for three additional
agency-level  variables:  The  number  of  email  addresses  posted  online  (Addresses,  1.5),  the
regional direction under which the office is organized (Region;  10 in total),  and whether the
office is in East Germany, i.e. the former German Democratic Republic (East).
3.9. Balance
If randomization was faithfully executed, the distribution of covariates should be similar across
treatment conditions. To assess balance, in Appendix Tables 5 through 7, we split the samples
across  the  five  treatment  conditions,  again  reporting  the  sample  size,  mean  and  standard
deviation of the eight pretreatment covariates. In Table 5, we split the sample along the ethnicity
treatment  conditions,  demonstrating  that  there are  no discernible  differences  across the three
treatments. The final three columns report p-values from t-tests, testing whether the means of the
variables  are  different.  Of  these,  one  test  for  the  difference  between  the  share  of  migrants,
between the offices receiving putatively Turkish and Romanian requests, yields a marginally
significant  difference.  In Table 6, we split  the sample along the gender and skill  treatments.
Offices in the male and female conditions exhibit significant differences in their share of migrant
population and their likelihood of being located in East Germany. Finally, in Table 7, we assess
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the balance across the legal backing (endorsed) and formality treatments, finding one significant
deviation between informal and formal requests. We conclude that randomization produced a
well-balanced sample, and report estimations with and without adjustment for covariates below.24
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Estimation
Our benchmark analyses  estimate  the effects  of the five main  treatments  on our  three main
outcome measures.
We estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation:
where  Y i  represents the outcome of agency i and the following variables represent the five
treatment indicators each agency was assigned to.  εi  represents the error term. The remaining
variables are pre-treatment pre-registered control variables, which are included in some models
to assess robustness and reduce estimate variability.25 In line with Freedman (2008), we do not
estimate logistic regressions for the binary outcome (i.e., the response dummy), but fit a linear
probability model using OLS.
24 An even more comprehensive overview of covariate balance can be obtained by testing for differences of all 8
covariates across all 55 unique treatment comparisons (e.g., Turkish vs. Female). Doing so results in 440 tests of
which 5 yield significant differences — less than one would predict on the basis of chance alone. Figure 10 in
the Appendix plots the distribution of p-values of these tests.
25 As described above, we do not include the pre-registered Appeals variable as a control given that 15 percent of
observations are missing. We address this issue in the Robustness section (4.5.).
95
Given the conjoint design of the experiment, we estimate the average marginal component effect
(ACME;  Hainmüller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014)). In essence, the AMCE scrutinizes the
difference in outcomes by comparing two different attributes (e.g., skilled vs. unskilled), holding
all other attributes constant by averaging over them. When comparing two attributes, the random
assignment of all five treatments ensures that the remaining attributes are identically distributed.
The approach also allows us to compare detailed profiles such as Turkish women vs. Romanian
women — a feature we make use of below.
4.2. Response rates
Table 3 displays the main results. To ease interpretation, Figure 2 plots the coefficients from the
same six models.  No treatment condition has a statistically significant effect on the response
dummy (Any response). In particular, a foreign alias is only 0.4 percent less likely to receive a
response. Female applicants are 2.6 percent less likely, while unskilled applicants are 2.3 percent
more likely to receive a response. Applicants that do not mention a lawyer are 3.0 percent less
likely to receive a response, while informally written emails  are 5.4 percent less likely to be
answered. None of these differences, however, are statistically significant (or even marginally
so).
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Importantly,  the absence of significant response differences demonstrates that non-response is
not  systematically  linked to treatment  status.  To buttress this  finding,  we additionally assess
whether there are any treatment combinations that experience significantly lower response rates.
To do so, we note that the conjoint design of the study produces 155 unique trait counterfactuals
one  can  compare.  Specifically,  these  combinations  represent  treatment  counterfactuals  (e.g.,
female vs. male), where the remaining treatments are either randomly distributed — as is the
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Figure 2: Coefficients of main results, taken  from Table 3.
case in the models discussed thus far — or fixed at one or several specific traits (e.g., skilled
male).  Overall,  there  are  31  comparisons  per  treatment,  which  adds  up  to  155  unique
comparisons given the five overall treatments. 26
For all of the 155 combinations,  we ran regressions of the unique treatment indicator on the
response dummy. In Figure 3, we report p-values from all 155 models. Only 7 models yield
significant  differences  in  the  response  dummy.  Overall,  the  p-values  are  almost  uniformly
distributed.  This is strong evidence that response rates are unrelated to treatment status. The
following analyses, which rely on the subset of the 321 responsive offices, are hence causally
identified in the sense that all requests had similar probabilities of being received by any given
office and being responded to.
26 Note that the Turkish and Romanian names were grouped into one “foreign” treatment. Examples of the 155
comparisons include: male vs. female; skilled male vs. skilled female; skilled formal male vs. skilled formal
female, etc. Note also that these samples have different sample sizes, which renders p-values an imperfect unit of
comparison.
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Figure 3: P-values from regressions of the response dummy on all 155 unique trait indicators.
4.3. Response quality
Having established that response rates are unrelated to treatment status, we turn to our main
quality  outcome.  As  can  be  seen  in  column  2  of  Table  3,  putative  non-Germans  receive
responses of substantively and statistically significantly lower quality. Their responses score an
average of 0.41 points lower on the 5-point quality scale. This is equivalent to a 21 percent (0.3
standard deviation) decline.
The female, unskilled and unendorsed treatments also experience lower quality responses (0.07,
0.25, and 0.13, respectively). These differences, however, are not significant, though they are in
line with our hypotheses (H1-H3). The informality treatment receives higher quality responses.
The finding is contrary to Hypothesis 4, yet the effect is substantively small and not significant.
In column 5 we find that non-German aliases do not receive significantly shorter emails. The
estimated length reduction is a mere 41 characters. The other treatment statuses do not elicit
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Table 3: Treatment effects on main outcomes.
significantly longer or shorter responses, either. Indeed, the coefficients for the gender and skill
treatment are in the opposite direction of our hypotheses. This result is noteworthy given that
response length,  being easy to measure,  has previously been used as a measure for response
quality (Distelhorst and Hou (2014)).
To further  assess  the relationship  between length  and quality,  in  Figure 4 we plot  response
quality on the y-axis and the response length on the x-axis.27 To reduce the role of outliers, we
plot  the  order  of  lengths.  The  bottom  chart  motivates  this  choice,  demonstrating  that  the
relationship between length and rank is similar  across treatment  statuses.  Importantly,  across
ethnic treatment statuses, emails of shorter length are of poorer quality on average. However, as
email lengths increase, putative Germans receive higher quality responses than putative Turks
and Romanians. This highlights the benefits of coding response quality manually as opposed to
relying on simpler measures.
27 The overall correlation between substantive quality and response length in our sample is 0.41.
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4.4. Response tone
Next, we test our hypotheses regarding friendliness and formality. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3
demonstrate that there are no significant differences across the five main treatments on either
outcome measure. All estimates are remarkably close to 0. In Column 6 of Table 3, we show that
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Figure 4: Quality of responses by length of email.
the  mistakes  per  responses  are  also  statistically  indistinguishable  across  treatments,  with
differences remarkably close to 0 across all traits.
Taken together, we interpret these results as evidence that German welfare offices discriminate
against non-German applicants, and that they do so along the margin of response quality,  not
response rates. When interpreting these results, it should be kept in mind that our requests do not
correspond  to  negative  stereotypes  of  welfare  use:  all  putative  applicants  claim  to  have
previously  worked in  Germany,  and therefore  do  not  at  all  resemble  “poverty  migrants”  as
portrayed by some media outlets. Effects would likely be more pronounced if this were not the
case.
4.5. Robustness
In the Appendix,  we assess  the robustness  of  these findings  by estimating  the same models
controlling for covariates and including fixed effects (Table 8). The estimates are highly similar
in size and significance to those reported in Table 3. Moreover, in the same table, we also run
models where we drop the 24 pre-test observations that were gathered two months prior to the
main  wave,  which  used  a  different  Turkish  female  given  name.  In  Table  10,  we  drop  all
observations  from East  Germany,  as  we had pre-registered.  In  both cases,  the estimates  are
essentially unchanged.
Next, we revisit the issue of the pre-registered Appeals control variable which, unbeknownst to
us, exhibits missingness in 15 percent of observations. First, we note that the variable is balanced
across  treatment  conditions  (see  Appendix  Tables  5-7).  Second,  in  Appendix  Table  15,  we
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demonstrate that, regarding the quality outcome, including the Appeals variable reduces the point
estimates for the foreign treatment by 0.15, while slightly increasing the estimates for the other
treatments. However, this is driven by the smaller sample induced by the missingness in this
variable, not by its inclusion as a control: repeating the analysis for the subset of observations
without  missingness,  without  including Appeals  as  a  control,  results  in  essentially  the  same
estimate. Third, in Appendix Table 16 we apply mean and multiple imputation to the missing
observations  of the  Appeals variable.  For the multiple  imputation  procedure we use the five
treatment  indicators  and three  remaining  pre-registered  control  variables  as  predictors.  Both
methods recover the original estimate of around 0.4 for the foreign treatment.
In Table 17 of the Appendix, following our pre-analysis plan, we estimate the same benchmark
regressions replacing missing outcome data in the quality variable that stem from non-response
with zeroes. This approach, made unnecessary by the fact that response rates are unrelated to
treatment status in our trial, also leaves estimates largely unaffected.
Finally, we demonstrate that all headline estimates are also obtained when using randomization
inference (Appendix section 7.2., Figures 5 through  9).
4.6. Disaggregating quality
The analyses  thus far have shown that  foreign-sounding aliases  receive qualitatively inferior
responses. Which components of the quality measure and which aliases drive this result? To
answer this question, Table 4 separately analyzes responses to the co-tenant question (Question
1) and the paperwork question (Question 2), simultaneously splitting up the foreign variable into
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the  Turkish  and  Romanian  statuses.  In  the  first  two  columns,  we  report  the  simple  OLS
regression without covariate adjustment; column 3 and 4 add covariates, and columns 5 and 6
add covariates and state-level fixed effects.
First, note that all point estimates are negative across all specifications, highlighting that non-
German aliases receive inferior responses relative to German aliases. Second, comparing across
questions, coefficients are more pronounced for the first question than for the second question.
To the extent that these questions can be thought of as tapping bureaucrats’ trust (Question 1)
and effort  (Question 2),  the result  appears consistent  with discrimination  based primarily  on
lower trust towards foreigners. Third, across both questions the response quality disadvantage is
slightly  larger  for  Turks  than  for  Romanians,  contradicting  our  expectation  that  Romanians
would be more disadvantaged (Hypothesis  1). However, note that none of the differences in
estimates are statistically significant (Gelman and Stern (2006)).
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Table 4: Treatment effects across both questions.
Note also that unskilled applicants receive lower-quality responses to question 1. This effect is
roughly similar in magnitude to the ethnicity effect but not detectable in question 2 and not
significant in all models.
4.7. Interactions
Next,  we utilize  the  conjoint  design  of  the  study to  parse  out  the  interactions  between  the
individual-level traits. Here, we restrict our analysis to the hypotheses spelled out in the pre-
registration document.
First, in Appendix Table 11, we separate formal from informal requests. The results demonstrate
that the response quality effect is higher for putatively foreign applicants with formal requests
than for those with informal requests. For the latter group, the quality disadvantage is small and
statistically indistinguishable from zero, while for the former group requests receive a substantial
reduction by 0.7 points (a statistically significant difference). This finding contradicts hypothesis
6,  which  states  that  discrimination  against  foreigners  is  mitigated  by  more  formal  writing.
Instead, the observed pattern might be explained by more formal requests reducing perceptions
of applicants’ need.
Second, in Appendix Table 12 we split up the sample along applicants mentioning (endo) and
not  mentioning  lawyers  (unendo).  Here,  our  hypothesis  that  unendorsed  applicants’  emails
receive lower quality responses than endorsed applicants is confirmed, though the estimates are
not  significantly  different.  There  are  two  additional  findings.  First,  endorsed  and  unskilled
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applicants  receive qualitatively inferior  emails  (a 0.45 drop, though not  significant).  Second,
informal but unendorsed applicants seem to receive more friendly emails.
Finally, in Appendix Table 13, we look at differences between skilled and unskilled applicants.
Several  findings  result  from  these  comparisons.  We  find  one  of  the  very  few  significant
differences in response rates: skilled foreign applicants appear to be more likely to receive a
response relative to unskilled ones. Both estimates are significantly different. Yet, among the
applicants which received answers, substantive quality is somewhat lower for skilled foreigners
than  for  unskilled  ones,  though  this  difference  is  not  significant.  In  addition,  we  find  that
unendorsed applicants receive less qualitative emails when skilled and less friendly emails when
unskilled.28
4.8. Bureaucratic organization 
We  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  bureaucratic  organization  of  the  offices  under  study.  In
particular, we hypothesized that independent welfare offices run by local governments are more
likely to discriminate than those embedded in the national bureaucracy (H7). In Appendix Table
9,  the sample is  split  into “independent” and “centralized” offices.  Recall  that  in centralized
offices,  work is  jointly  administered  by the national  welfare agency and local  governments.
Independent  offices,  on the other  hand,  are  run entirely by the local  government  in  a given
district.
28  For completeness, Appendix Table 14 splits the sample into male and female applicants, for which we did not
specify any hypotheses.
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Although estimate variability is high due to the small number of observations of independent
offices (76), the estimate of the quality disadvantage for foreigners in independent offices is
about twice as large as in centralized offices. Two words of caution, however, are in order. First,
bureaucratic  organization  was  not  randomly  assigned.  Even  if  the  difference  between
independent  and centralized offices is not due to chance,  it  may well  be due to selection of
districts into the independent status. The map in Figure 1, however, shows that, geographically
speaking, independent agencies are fairly evenly spread across Germany. Second, the difference
in the estimates, though sizeable, is not significant.
Having emphasized these caveats,  the finding is consistent with a literature on the effects of
centralized welfare administrations. Fording, Soss and Schram (2011), for example, argue that
more centralized bureaucratic arrangements are less conducive to biased behavior by officials in
the United States. If bureaucrats are subject to increased monitoring and have less discretion in
centralized  versus  decentralized  arrangements,  this  could  help  explain  differences  in
discriminatory behavior even if individual-level bias is regionally uniform.
Previous research on the organization of the German welfare offices indicates that bureaucrats in
independent offices do indeed have more leeway in decision-making than their colleagues in
centralized  offices.  The  official  evaluation  of  the  different  organizational  forms  of  welfare
agencies,  written in 2008, states: “Independent offices exhibit decentralized structures which,
based on the judgment of staff, is reflected in more flexibility and freedom of decision, but also
has the disadvantage of lower transparency in terms of regional and national controlling and
monitoring” (Deutscher Bundestag  (2008), p. 17). Thus, while more research on the effects of
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organizational forms is warranted, it is plausible that non-Germans are more likely to experience
discrimination in independent offices.
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This study used a conjoint experiment to assess whether German welfare offices treat requests
from  German  and  non-German  applicants  equally.  Relying  on  a  request  designed  to  elicit
substantively meaningful variation in responses and a pre-registered measure of response quality,
the trial provided evidence that prospective benefit applicants with foreign-sounding aliases are
no less likely to receive responses in general. However, putative foreigners receive emails of
significantly lower quality. We believe that the finding has several implications for the study of
discrimination in the public sphere.
First, the trial overcomes what we think is an empirical shortcoming in the existing literature. By
restricting attention to easily observable dimensions of interactions — above all, response rates
or lengths — researchers run the risk of making potentially faulty inferences about substantive
discrimination. Had the present study only measured response rates and lengths, one would have
inferred that German welfare offices treat all applicants equally. However, as was shown, such a
reading would have been wrong: responses sent to putative foreigners were, on the whole, less
helpful to applicants in a way that is substantively important. The reduction in quality we report
plausibly  affects  applicants’  perceptions  of  the  burdens  involved  in  applying  for  benefits,
potentially  impacting  their  decision  on  whether  or  not  to  apply.29 Arguably,  there  is  no
straightforward and sensible way of determining the substantive importance of response rates
29 A large body of research has demonstrated that information plays an important role in decision-making about
benefit applications (Duflo and Saez (2002), Daponte, Sanders and Taylor (1999)).
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relative to the information value contained in responses.  But at  a minimum, we believe that
future studies that use information requests should make explicit  attempts, defined ex ante if
possible, to measure the quality of responses, in order to avoid the pitfalls we have highlighted.
The use of outcome variables that are directly substantively meaningful may be an even more
promising alternative.
Second, the findings give rise to an interesting substantive question, namely, why discrimination
occurs along the quality and not the response dimension. We see two potential explanations.
On the one hand, it may be psychologically easier for biased bureaucrats to respond to requests
in a relatively superficial way rather than ignoring them outright — especially in the presence of
strong antiprejudice  norms.  Blinder,  Ford  and Ivarsflaten  (2013)  suggest  that  citizens  try  to
control their prejudiced thoughts and actions in order to comply with such norms. However, their
ability to do so varies across situations. If not responding to a query is more cognitively salient as
a prejudiced act than drafting a less helpful response, this might explain the divergence between
the two dimensions.
On the other hand, the effect  may be due to our case selection:  to the extent  that front-line
bureaucrats  are  subject  to  more  stringent  monitoring  by  their  hierarchy  in  Germany  than
elsewhere, discriminating along the quality margin instead of the response margin might be a
way of obscuring discrimination vis-à-vis superiors. Since response rates to official emails are
plausibly  easier  to  monitor  than  their  content,  this  could  explain  why  we  do  not  find
discrimination along the response margin — in stark contrast with previous studies.
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Third, we find tentative evidence suggesting that the prevalence of discrimination is negatively
related to the bureaucratic centralization of welfare offices. While the study cannot conclusively
answer this question, the effects of administrative decentralization for equality and impartiality
in public service provision constitute a fruitful area for future research. 
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“Dear Sir / Madam,
My name is [A/B] and I have a question about Hartz 4. I worked a few years as an independent
[C]. Now, I need to close my business because I do not have enough customers and want to
apply for Hartz 4. But a friend [D] has said that this could be complicated because I live with
friends in an apartment. Before I go to your office, I therefore want to ask if I need to bring my
roommates documents, too? Or are my own papers sufficient? And what papers do I need to
bring exactly?




My names [A/B] and I have a question about harz4. I worked a few years as an independent [C]..
Now, I need to close my business because I do not have enough customers! And I want to apply
for  harz4.  But  a  friend [D] said that  may be complicated  because  I  live  with friends  in  an
apartment? Before I  go to your  office I  therefore want to  ask if  I  need to  bring roommates
documents? Or are my papers sufficient?
And what papers do I need to bring exactly??
Please write me an email. Thanks [A/B]
Formal Instrument German
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, ich heisse [A/B] und habe eine Frage zu Hartz 4. Und zwar war
ich einige Jahre als [C]  selbstständig. Jetzt muss ich mein  Geschäft wegen zu wenig Kunden
schliessen und will Hartz 4 beantragen. Aber ein Freund [D] hat gesagt dass das kompliziert
werden könnte, weil ich mit Freunden in einer Wohngemeinschaft wohne. Bevor ich zum Amt
komme wollte ich deshalb fragen, ob ich über meine Mitbewohner auch Dokumente mitbringen
muss. Oder reichen die Papiere über mich? Und welche Papiere brauche ich genau?
Über eine Antwort per Email würde ich mich sehr freuen.
Vielen Dank, [A/B]
Informal Instrument German
Hallo, ich heisse [A/B] und habe eine frage zu harz 4. Und zwar war ich einige jahre als [C]
selbstständig.. Jetzt muss ich mein  Geschäft wegen zu wenig Kunden schliesen! Und ich will
harz4 beantragen. Aber ein freund [D] hat gesagt das ist vieleicht kompliziert weil ich nämlich
mit freunden in eine wohngemeinschaft wohne? Bevor ich zum amt gehe will ich sie deswegen
fragen ob sie von meinen mitbewohnern auch dokumente brauchen. Oder reichen die papiere
über mich? Und welche papiere brauche ich genau??
Bitte schreiben sie mir eine email. Danke [A/B] 
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IV. TAX CAPS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE U.S.30
Abstract
A growing literature argues that citizen’s political  participation is motivated at
least in part by the state’s power to levy taxes on them. In line with that argument,
it  has  been  suggested  that  caps  on  local  taxation  decrease  turnout  in  local
elections. This in turn implies that there might be a causal relationship between
the spread of tax caps in the U.S. states and decreasing turnout in local elections
in the past decades. This paper uses county-level tax restrictions on municipalities
in Illinois and micro-level turnout data from over 7 million voters to investigate
this hypothesis systematically.  Using panel regression models with and without
matching  adjustment,  I  find  no  statistically  discernible  effect  of  tax  caps  on
turnout. This might be due to the fact that the fiscal effects of the Illinois tax cap
only accrued slowly over time, potentially dampening behavioral responses.
30 I would like to thank Olle Folke, Yotam Margalit and Justin Phillips for their advice and guidance, and Bruce
Cain, Donald Green, Jens Hainmüller, David Nickerson, Dick Simpson, and participants at the 2014 Meeting of
the Midwest Political Science Association and the 2014 Alexander Hamilton Center NYU Graduate Student
Conference on Political Economy for helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks are due to Wolfgang
Silbermann for helping me start this project. I am also grateful to staff at the Illinois State Board of Elections, the
Illinois Municipal League, the Illinois Department of Revenue,  and Stanford University’s libraries, who were
very helpful and generous with their time. 
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1. Introduction 
Taxation  is  one  of  the  most  significant  links  between  individuals  and  the  state.  A  sizable
literature in political economy has investigated aspects of this relationship in democratic polities.
Bates and Lien (1985) developed a seminal theory of representative democracy based on a quid-
pro-quo between citizens as a tax base and a government in need of revenue offering them some
decision-making power over policy in exchange for taxation. More recently, several studies have
argued that government taxing power is an important motive for political participation. Kasara
and Suryanayaran  (2014) argue based on cross-country evidence that  the patterns  of turnout
differences  between  affluent  and  poor  citizens  are  explained  by  the  taxing  capacities  of
governments. In their argument, affluent citizens turn out to vote if the government can tax them
in order to avoid an increasing tax burden, but they leave voting to poor citizens if the threat of
taxation  is  not  imminent.  In  a  similar  vein,  experimental  work  by Paler  (2013)  shows  that
citizens  are  more  willing  to  monitor  their  governments  if  government  revenue  is  based  on
taxation as opposed to windfalls. If government’s taxing power motivates citizens to participate
in the political process, then reductions in or restrictions of this taxing power should result in
lower political participation. 
This logic suggests that there might be a causal connection between two distinct phenomena that
have occurred in the United States over the past decades: the spread of tax caps in U.S. states on
the one hand, and the decline of turnout in local elections on the other. The rapid increase in tax
caps,  or  tax  and expenditure  limitations  (TELs)  more  generally,  began  with  the  passage  of
Proposition  13  in  California  in  1978.  These  rules  generally  restrict  the  ability  of  local
governments to raise revenue, often targeting property tax collection which is the most important
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local  revenue  source.  Currently,  46  states  have  some  kind  of  TEL  constraining  local
governments in place (Mullins and Wallin (2004)).  
 
Concurrently,  turnout  in  U.S.  local  elections  has  been declining  from its  already-low levels.
While  the  lack  of  a  central  data  repository  complicates  the  empirical  description  of  this
phenomenon, Caren’s (2007) study of turnout in big U.S. cities suggests that average turnout
declined by 7 percentage points between the late 1970s and the early 2000s. Some of this decline
seems to be accounted for by institutional  factors such as the form of local government and
variation in campaign efforts. 
Might the spread of tax caps across the U.S. have played a causal role in local turnout decline?
Some anecdotal evidence suggests so. In a qualitative study of the effects of Proposition 13 in
California, Sokolow (1998) finds that capping property taxation visibly affected participation in
local  politics.  As  he  argues,  “severely  limiting  local  control  over  the  property  tax  tends  to
diminish representative democracy at the community level” (ibid., p. 182 ff.).  
In this study, I measure the effects of an effective tax cap reform in Illinois on turnout in local
elections in order to assess this hypothesis more systematically. Using county-level variation in
tax cap status induced by the reform and administrative turnout data from the Illinois voter file, I
find that the tax cap did not reduce local turnout appreciably. This result is highly similar across
subsets of locales and voters and unaffected by matching adjustments to the sample of control
observations. This suggests that the Illinois tax cap did not contribute to local turnout decline.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses previous research on tax
caps, local turnout and mechanisms that could relate the two. Section 3 introduces the Illinois tax
cap while section 4 gives an overview of the data and descriptive statistics. Results are presented
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Tax caps and local turnout
Electoral participation at the local level is typically very low in the United States. Exactly how
low it  is  in  the  average  municipality  is  unknown due  to  severe  data  constraints.  However,
samples  from large  cities  indicate  an  average  of  only  about  27% (Caren  (2007))  in  recent
decades, with the bulk of the distribution between 20 and 40% and a negative development over
time.  This is significantly lower than the average estimated in the first  major  study of local
turnout by Alford and Lee (1968), who found an average of 43.5% turnout in local elections that
were held concurrently with state and national races, and 31.2% in elections that were not. 
 
Turnout in American local elections is so low that it actually matters for outcomes. This is not
obvious, since a literature on elections to national offices has mostly found turnout not to matter
much for election outcomes.  For example,  Citrin Schickler and Sides (2003) show that  U.S.
Senate election outcomes would not change very much if turnout was higher in total or equal
across groups. However,  as Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) show using the example of ethnic
minorities in large cities, the partisan and ethnic distribution of representation in local offices
would be changed substantially if all groups voted at similar levels. This is because in local
elections  with lower turnout,  there is  much more room for skew, and because given sorting
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patterns,  minority  groups  are  much  more  likely  to  be  numerically  important  in  smaller
geographic units. 
Scholarship attempting to explain variation in local turnout has focused on broadly institutional
factors. Most notably, Progressive Era institutions designed to reduce the power of local political
machines,  including non-partisan local elections and council-manager government,  have been
frequently been found to correlate negatively with turnout in many studies including Alford and
Lee (1968), Karnig and Walter (1983) and Caren (2007). 
 
An important study by Hajnal and Lewis (2003) corroborates this finding, but also makes an
important and more general argument: as the authors argue, “institutional changes that tend to
raise the stakes of local elections also increase turnout.” (ibid., p. 645) Using data from a survey
of California county clerks, they show that besides the timing of elections and the form of city
government, institutional factors such as the privatization of city services and the prevalence of
direct  democracy  are  also  strongly  related  to  local  turnout:  outsourced  service  provision  is
associated with lower turnout, and direct democracy is associated with higher turnout. 
 
Following  this  logic,  reducing  the  room  for  fiscal  decision-making  at  the  local  level  by
instituting  a  binding tax  cap  should  also  be expected  to  decrease  local  election  turnout.  As
Mullins and Wallin (2004) document, tax caps of various forms have become ubiquitous across
the U.S. states  in  the past decades.  A large body of economic research has investigated  the
effects  of  these  caps,  and  found  them  to  be  generally  effective  in  reducing  revenue  and
expenditure,  although  effectiveness  varies  as  a  function  of  their  design  and  the  economic
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environment  (Poterba  and  Rueben  (1995),  Figlio  (1998),  Cutler,  Elmendorf  and  Zeckhauser
(1999), Skidmore (1999)). 
 
Thus, the co-occurence of the spread of tax caps and decreasing local turnout could be more than
a coincidence: increasing constraints on local fiscal policy brought about by tax caps might have
causally contributed to turnout decline.  
 
Two types of mechanisms could be responsible for such a relationship. First, one could imagine
a “stakes mechanism” driven by reduced utility differentials between alternative candidates or
programs. Second, there could be a “salience mechanism” driven by the reduced visibility of the
tax burden and the increasing complexity of local public finance following tax restrictions. 
 
To  clarify  the  “stakes  mechanism”,  suppose  there  are  two  candidates,  whose  platforms  are
characterized  by promised levels  of  local  public  goods provision,  in  a local  election.  Public
goods provision is fully funded by a lump sum tax on residents, and citizens’ utility is a function
only of public goods consumption and private consumption. Since spending on public goods can
not exceed taxes collected, there is a trade-off between public and private consumption. In a very
simple calculus-of-voting framework, voters turn out at the election if their benefits from doing
so exceed their costs, where their benefits are the probability of being decisive in the election
times the utility difference between the two platforms (Downs (1957), Riker and Ordeshook
(1968)). This implies that turnout increases in a voter’s chances of being pivotal,  and in the
voter’s utility difference between the alternative candidates. Now, a ceiling (TEL) is imposed on
the maximum tax  that  can be collected.  If  both proposals  imply  taxes  below the maximum,
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nothing  changes. If one of the proposals was in excess of the new maximum, the difference
between the two proposals decreases. If both proposals were in excess of the maximum, the
difference  becomes  zero,  and  therefore  (weakly)  decreases.  Therefore,  under  a  ceiling  that
constrains at least one of the platforms, one would expect voters to turn out less following the
instatement of a tax cap (see also Andersen, Fiva and Natvik (2014)).
 
Besides reducing the stakes of elections, TELs may also affect participation through a salience
mechanism.  Qualitative  research  by Sokolow (1998)  on  the  politics  of  local  tax  restrictions
suggests that this was the case for Proposition 13 in California. Based on interviews with local
officials in that state, he finds that the strong constraints that Proposition 13 imposed on local
fiscal policy-making fundamentally changed local politics. It is worth quoting his hypothesis at
some length here: 
“The search in this state for alternative revenues has transformed a fairly simple
local  fiscal  system into  one  much  more  complicated  and  little  understood  by
elected officials and citizens. In place of the process before Proposition 13 that
revolved around annual decisions on property-tax rates by local governments, the
revenue  side  of  budgeting  now  has  no  central  focus.  Instead,  it  is  an
amalgamation of considerations about numerous smaller revenue sources (user
fees,  building  revenues,  sales  tax,  motor  vehicle  license  fees,  and so on)  and
yearly  state  fiscal  actions.  With  ongoing  uncertainty  and  less  control  over
revenues, elected governing boards engage less in comprehensive priority-setting
and long-range planning than before Proposition 13. Local budgets also receive
less  public  scrutiny.  With  no  controllable  target  like  the  property-tax  rate  to
retain  their  interest  and  activity,  taxpayers  seldom  turn  out  for  local  budget
hearings, nor do they communicate directly with their elected representatives on
fiscal matters as frequently as in the old days.” (ibid., p. 184) 
While  he  does  not  utilize  the  term  “salience”,  Sokolow’s  hypothesis  clearly  concerns  the
visibility of a given tax burden and the complexity of local public finance, and not the stakes of
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elections in an objective sense. His claim dovetails with more recent behavioural public finance
research by Cabral and Hoxby (2013) on the high salience of the property tax. They show that
the property tax is the most salient (and least popular) tax in the United States because unlike
most taxes it is not paid through withholding, but through relatively rare property tax bills with
relatively high bill amounts that require many individuals to save in advance or go into short-
term debt to pay.  Using arbitrary variation in property tax salience due to different payment
methods, they are able to show that higher tax salience has substantive political effects, causing
local property tax rates to be lower and more likely to be politically restricted.  By the same
token, the “salience mechanism” would lead one to expect individuals to participate  in local
politics more when a given tax burden is made more salient, even if the total tax burden and the
stakes of elections remain constant. 
 
Although  this  hypothesis  is  plausible,  little  direct  evidence  of  such  a  causal  relationship  is
offered  in  Sokolow’s  work  on tax  caps,  and it  remains  difficult  of  course  to  systematically
disentangle changes brought about by the tax cap from other developments in local politics. 
 
However, research on tax caps in other contexts offers an indication that tax caps may indeed
reduce  turnout.  A  recent  study  by  Revelli  (2013)  investigates  the  turnout  effects  of  a  tax
limitation in Italian local elections. Using freezes of a local income tax surcharge rate, he shows
that  tax  freezes  are  associated  with  modest  turnout  declines  in  a  panel  analysis.  Moreover,
looking at a specific freeze that only affected a subset of municipalities, he shows that this result
holds up even when using national elections as a comparison group.  
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3. The Illinois tax cap
Whether U.S. tax caps have similarly detrimental effects on local politics is difficult to measure
for  several  reasons.  First,  U.S.  tax  caps  often  arise  endogenously  from  direct  democratic
institutions and anti-tax movements, making it hard to identify their own effect. For example, an
active and combative anti-tax movement may bring a referendum on a TEL, but may also in
itself change the electoral incentives of politicians to change the size of the public sector.  
 
Second,  although  most  of  the  variation  in  tax  caps  is  across  states,  tax  caps  are  highly
heterogeneous. There are caps on revenue growth, caps on assessments, caps on tax rates,  and
caps on expenditures.  Some caps  are indexed to inflation, and others to a fixed growth factor.
Moreover,  the ability  of local  governments  to circumvent  TELs also diffes based  on factors
specific to a state’s legal environment and the wording of the TEL. This means that any cross-
state  study  of  caps  would  necessarily  lump  together  estimates  of  the  effects  of  very
heterogeneous policies, making it difficult to interpret results.  
 
Thirdly,  even if  caps  were reasonably homogenous,  the  voting  data  necessary for  a  large-N
cross-state study would be near-impossible to obtain: as mentioned above, extant studies of local
turnout are typically forced to send send out surveys to county clerks in order to obtain local
turnout results.  
 
To circumvent these problems, I estimate the effect of the Property Tax Extension Limitation
Act (PTELA) in Illinois, which was passed in the summer of 1991. Although PTELA is legally
an Illinois Public Law, it never applied to the entire state, but has only applied to so-called non-
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home-rule municipalities in select counties over time.  The tax cap was first applied to the five
“collar counties” around Cook County in 1991 by the State Legislature, then to Cook County
itself in 1994, and then to other counties following county-level referenda in the years after 1996.
I use this within-state variation in tax cap status to estimate the effects of  the cap on political
participation. As regards the outcome measure, Illinois local elections are held in the spring of
odd-numbered years, while state-wide elections are held in even-numbered years. This allows me
to use the Illinois voter file to measure local turnout in each municipality. In the remainder of
this section, I briefly describe the history and design of the PTELA tax cap in more detail . 
 
The Illinois tax cap was one of the cornerstones of the gubernatorial campaign of Jim Edgar, a
Republican who entered the 1990 race to replace James Thompson, who had been governor for
14 years. He had tried to advance it in the General Assembly before the election, but it had not
been  reported  out  of  committee  because  of  Democratic  opposition  (Chicago  Tribune
(2/13/1991)). Upon taking office, Edgar still faced the same democratic majority in the Illinois
General assembly. In his first “state of the state” address, he outlined his plans for a tax cap that
would limit the growth of property tax collections in all local entities with taxing power. That
same day, he also called for a special legislative session of the Assembly, which did not act on
the proposal. (ibid.) 
In a series of interviews given for an oral history project for the Abraham Lincoln Presidential
Library in 2009, 10 years after he decided not to run for reelection in 1999, Edgar described the
situation in the following way: “The Democrats didn’t laugh at me, but they ignored me. They
said, “That isn’t going to happen.” And the lobby groups like the teachers’ unions, they said,
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“That isn’t going to happen.”” (Edgar (2010), p. 557) When the Assembly did not react to bills
proposed by Republican representatives, Edgar called additional special sessions.  
“We’d call these special sessions, and they really got a little testy because I think
one time I made them stay in an extra day or something like that. This was after
about  the  third  time  they  hadn’t  responded,  so  they  really  thought  I  was
grandstanding, because they weren’t going to do this. Of course, I kept trying to
put pressure on them to do something, or at least looked like I was trying. I didn’t
want people to say, “Well, he didn’t really mean this; he didn’t really push hard
enough.” I began to think, we may not get this. Republican legislators kind of
liked it because it was something they could talk about back home. I don’t know
if they cared about passing it, but it was a great issue to blame the Democrats for
holding up” (ibid., 558). 
 
Edgar  himself  considered  the  tax  cap  proposal  he  made  “draconian”  because  it  capped  tax
collections growth at  the  lesser of 5% or the rate of inflation.  According to him,  this was a
strategically exaggerated demand that he hoped to use in a deal later by allowing 5% growth. In
his words, “I thought, we’ll compromise on this, but this is a place to start. I’m not going to start
with my compromise” (ibid.). 
The  proposal  faced  stiff  opposition  in  the  House,  and  Democratic  leaders  labeled  it  as
“Reaganomics” because of its overall regressive effects (Chicago Tribune (6/2/1991)). Beyond
the Democratic party, however, some interest groups also came out strongly in opposition to the
plan.  Teacher’s  unions  mobilized  against  the  proposal,  and  the  Illinois  Municipal  League
described it  as  “an encroachment  upon the  powers  of  local  governments”  (Chicago Tribune
(2/14/1991)). Municipalities argued they would have to increase non-tax user fees, and reduce
public  goods  provision:  “In  Kane  County,  Elgin  City  Manager  Larry  Rice  said  that  if  the
property-tax cap becomes law, the fast-growing suburb would be unable to begin a project to
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improve several major roads, including Dundee, Highland and Big Timber Roads.” (Chicago
Tribune (7/16/1991))
While the tax cap was popular with voters and some Democrats in the Senate, it could not have
passed against the opposition of the Speaker of the House. However, it also became entangled in
the broader budget fight of 1991: towards the end of the fiscal year, there was still no budget, and
a lot of uncertainty surrounding revenue because of a temporary income tax surcharge that many
representatives wanted to make permanent. Democrats introduced a $1 billion spending bill to
fund AFDC, nutrition programs for children and and the indigent even if the budget were to be
adopted late. Edgar, demanding a budget solution “in one piece”, vetoed it, and Democrats failed
to override his veto in the Senate. After that defeat,  Democrats sought a compromise on the
property tax cap. According to Edgar, Democratic leaders approached him with a suggestion to
limit the property tax caps to collar counties surrounding Chicago, under which condition they
would back it in the House. To Edgar’s own surprise, they did not take issue with the 5%-or-
inflation rule, and so for the counties affected, the effect was even more pronounced than Edgar
had expected when proposing the cap. (Edgar (2010), p. 560) 
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The reasons behind the Democrat’s proposal to limit the tax cap to some counties are not entirely
clear. One plausible explanation is that the five collar counties (Will, Kane, Lake, McHenry and
DuPage, see Figure 1), containing many wealthy suburbs, were (and are) leaning more towards
the Republican Party than Chicago and Cook County. Democrats might have cared more about
teacher’s and municipal employee’s unions in Cook county, which were more clearly on their
side politically. The focus on the area around Chicago could also be related to the fact that this is
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Figure 1: Illinois counties (Census Bureau).
where property prices went up the most in the 1990s, thus increasing the value of the property
tax base and boosting property tax collections.  
After  publication  of  the  deal,  the  Illinois  Library  Association,  AFSCME  (The  American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees) the Illinois Municipal League and some
other organizations sought to challenge the property tax cap legally, arguing that it would render
municipalities  unable  to  provide  services  they  were  mandated  by law to  provide.  However,
funding  for  the  lawsuit  was  insufficient  due  to  classic  collective  action  problems  (Chicago
Tribune (10/15/1991)), and the property tax cap went into effect as Illinois Public Law 87-17 on
October 1st, 1991, limiting the growth of total property tax collections (not rates or assessments)
to the lesser of 5% or the rate of inflation in the collar counties.  Partly because the Democrats
had surprised Edgar with their offer, it was one of the more restrictive laws of this kind. 
Due in part to the popularity of the tax cap even in Democratic constituencies, the property tax
cap was then extended in two waves. First, Cook County came under the tax cap in 1994 after a
non-binding referendum in that  county had shown overwhelming support.  Then, in 1996 the
Illinois General Assembly allowed voters in all counties, on proposals from county boards, to
hold referenda on whether or not to adopt the tax cap. Successively, 39 of 102 Illinois counties
adopted the tax cap between 1994 and 2004, the last year of turnout data in my voter file. 9
counties rejected the tax cap in referenda (Illinois Library Association (2013)).  
However, even within capped counties, not all municipalities' tax rates are restricted by PTELA:
the cap only applies to non-home rule taxing districts (Illinois Department of Revenue (2012)).
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Home rule is a status of local jurisdictions that is regulated in different ways in each state. The
Illinois  constitution of 1970 affords home-rule municipalities  more  latitude over local  issues
ranging  from taxation  to  local  debt  and investment,  unless  the  General  Assembly  explicitly
restricts these. Municipalities with population above 25,000 are automatically home-rule, while
those  with  lower  population  can  choose  to  have  referenda  to  make  them  home-rule.
Municipalities with population above 25,000 can also hold referenda to make them non-home-
rule. As a result, the tax cap applies to a larger share of municipalities than Illinois residents.
Figure 2 displays the share of municipalities under the tax cap over time. 
The Illinois tax cap is widely considered to have been very effective at reducing the growth of
property tax  revenue  in  the  affected  counties.  Research  has  also  shown that,  relative  to  the
counties not affected, property tax revenue decreased after the reform both for school districts
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Figure 2: Share of municipalities under the Illinois tax cap 
between 1990 and 2005.
and  for  municipalities  (Dye  and  McGuire  (1997)).  Later  research  by  Dye,  McGuire  and
McMillen  (2005)  also  indicates  that  the  county-level  caps  enacted  after  1996  were  just  as
effective as the earlier ones, and notably became more effective over time.  
These results accord with the statements and behavior of the relevant actors involved at the time.
The tax  cap's initiator Jim Edgar was, perhaps unsurprisingly,  convinced of its effectiveness,
saying “if you look at the numbers, it’s pretty spectacular” (Edgar (2010), p. 561). Moreover, the
fervent opposition of relevant interest groups even before passage of the tax cap suggests that its
fiscal effects were not impossible to anticipate. 
4. Data and descriptive statistics
Throughout  the  study,  I  use  the  2004  Illinois  voter  file  to  measure  turnout.  It  contains
information on every voter that was registered to vote in Illinois in 2004, about 7.1 million voters
in total. Most importantly, and with equally important exceptions, it contains turnout in primary
and general elections  for every year  (that the voter was registered) between 1990 and 2004.
Beyond that, it contains geographic information, the date of voter registration, and voter’s age
and gender. It also contains a variable on a voter’s party registration. While Illinois does not
require  voters  to  identify  their  party  when they register,  voters  are  coded as  Republican  or
Democratic when they choose either partisan ballot in the primary election. Voters that never
vote in primaries, or only vote on referenda and non-partisan races using the nonpartisan ballot,
are coded as Independents. 
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The voter file contains all registered voters in 2004, but it does not necessarily contain the voting
history of all voters that voted in elections in the early 1990s: Voters that died, moved or were
imprisoned could have been purged from the rolls. Voter registration lists are maintained by
counties, who are required by Illinois law to verify voter addresses every two years. This is done
by sending out new voter ID cards, and tagging those returned as undeliverable by USPS. Those
voters  tagged are then suspended from voting,  but  not deleted from the list.  Instead,  county
clerks try to to send a letter to a forwarding address, if available, to verify a move and then delete
a voter from the list. If the ID card is undeliverable but the forwarding does not work and the
county clerk does not hear from a voter confirming he has moved out of the state, it takes 5 years
for a voter to actually be deleted from the list. Therefore, the data give an almost complete, but
not entirely complete picture of turnout because of out-migration.
Some of the registration dates in the data are problematic. I generally code voters as registered in
an election if their registration date was before the election date (grace period registration allows
voters to register up to 3 days prior to an election in Illinois). However, first of all, just under
100,000  observations  (out  of  7.1  million)  have  missing  registration  dates.  Among  those
observations with registration dates, some are coded as having turned out in an election which
took place before their initial registration date. For example, in the 1991 election, about 180,000
voters are coded as having voted although they are not coded as registered in 1991. Around
35,000 of these have a missing registration date, but the remaining 145,000 observations (around
2% of total observations) have non-missing but logically inconsistent registration dates. These
cases need not be actual data errors, but likely represent in-state movers whose registration date
was changed when they moved between counties. Because I do not know whether and to what
146
extent voter’s registrations are connected in the voter file, I code voters that voted in any election
as having been registered at the time of that election, and keep all registered voters registered in
all subsequent elections; if their registration had become invalid, they would be unobserved.
 
Consolidated local elections in Illinois are generally held on the first Tuesday in April in odd-
numbered years, while local primaries are held on the third Tuesday in March. Most but not all
municipal elections in Illinois are non-partisan, while township and county elections are partisan.
The first local elections recorded in the voter file were held in March and April of 1991, which
was the spring before the first wave of the tax cap. In primary elections, voters determine who
runs in the general elections, which then determine who holds the local offices (aldermen, village
presidents/mayors,  clerks,  trustees, etc.).  This is true both for partisan and non-partisan local
elections. In the latter, having more than two nominations for an office triggered a non-partisan
primary during the observation period. 
 
For the analyses below, I link voters to jurisdictions using their census block and discard voters
that  live in unincorporated  areas (outside of any municipality).  I  then aggregate  turnout,  the
fraction of registered voters who turned out in any given election, at the census block level. The
final dataset contains 4392 census blocks with an average of about 280 registered voters per
block. Besides overall turnout, the data also allows me to calculate turnout for subgroups such as
registered Democrats or Republicans, males and females, and old and young voters. 
 
This choice of census blocks as level of analysis is motivated primarily by a desire to correctly
code when no election took place in a locale in a given year. For example, when a deceased or
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retiring council member is replaced, some voters in a municipality may get to vote in the local
election while in a neighboring ward in the same municipality, there are no offices to be filled.
Aggregating turnout at the census block level  avoids averaging across the two wards, which
would give the mistaken impression of low city-wide turnout. However, results are very similar
when aggregating at the municipality or county level. 
 
Another  advantage  of  using census  blocks  is  that  they are  most  fine-grained level  at  which
covariates are available. I merged Census data on housing and income to the voter file dataset.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the outcome variables and covariates. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
5. Empirical strategy and results
The most straightforward way to estimate the effect of the tax cap on turnout is to estimate linear
regression models with unit and year fixed effects. The identifying assumption of this approach
is that in the absence of the tax cap, changes in turnout would have evolved similarly in capped
counties  and  uncapped  counties.  However,  this  assumption  could  plausibly  be  violated:  for
example,  the  tax  cap  may  have  been  more  likely  to  apply  to  jurisdictions  with  positive  or
negative trends in turnout. This is especially relevant given that assignment to tax cap status was
intransparent in the first years of the reform and counties could select into the tax cap beginning
in 1996. 
 
Under the assumption that selection into tax cap status was not independent of potential turnout
but driven exclusively by observable covariates (selection on observables), one can improve over
the  fixed-effects  approach  by  using  matching  methods  to  adjust  the  sample  of  control
observations (Ho, Imai, King and Stuart (2007)) . I implement this in two different ways.
 
First,  I  use  propensity  score  matching  to  discard  control  observations  that  were  very
observationally different from treated observations in the baseline year 1991. Since turnout data
begins in 1991, this  allows for including one year  of pre-treatment  turnout as a predictor of
future tax cap status. I then run the fixed-effects model on the pre-processed sample. 
 
Second,  in  order  to  be  able  to  include  a  richer  pre-treatment  series  of  turnout  outcomes  as
predictors of tax status, I restrict attention to the extension of the tax cap through referenda after
1996. Disregarding the six counties  that  were treated  before 1996, I  use covariates  and pre-
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treatment  turnout  in  all  years  prior  to  1996 to  estimate  the  propensity  score.  I  then  discard
unmatched control observations and estimate the fixed-effects model. This strategy is likely to
considerably reduce selection bias since any remaining bias would have to be unrelated to pre-
treatment turnout, but affect turnout after the tax cap. Details on the matching procedures and
balance tables are available in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 3 gives an overview of the estimated effects of tax caps on general election turnout in the
aggregate and among registered Democrats and Republicans. Results from four specifications are
shown: the standard fixed-effects model with (1) and without (2) weighting of observations by
the number of registered voters, and the two matching procedures outlined above. Since tax cap
status varies at the county level, standard errors are clustered at the county level in all analyses. 
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The estimated effect of tax caps on turnout in local elections is very close to zero across all
specifications. The largest estimate in absolute terms is a mere negative 1.3 percentage points in
the fixed-effects specification with weights, and is not statistically distinguishable from zero. 
Full results are also reproduced in Tables 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d. 
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Figure  3:  Estimated  effects  of  the  tax  cap on local  turnout  in  general  elections  among all
registered  voters,  Democratic  voters  and  Republican  voters,  according  to  four  main
specifications. 
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Table 2a: Estimated effects of the tax cap on local turnout on turnout, fixed effects regression
specification.
Table 2b: Estimated effects of the tax cap on local turnout on turnout, fixed effects regression
specification, weighting census blocks by the number of registered voters.
Table 2c: Estimated effects of the tax cap on local turnout on turnout, fixed effects regression
specification on matching-adjusted sample (see Appendix for details).
This estimate is stable across general across and primary elections, as well as across the voter
subgroups among which I can measure turnout using the voter file. As depicted in Table 3 for the
benchmark specification, independents, voters younger or older than the median age of registered
voters, and male and female voters also do not appear to turn out more or less in response to tax
caps. 
One might hypothesize potential turnout effects of tax caps to be larger in locales with a higher
share of owners, higher incomes or higher housing values: individuals who own their housing are
more likely to be aware of the property tax burden than renters,  and richer owners of more
expensive housing might care more about property taxes than other people. However, analyses of
subsamples obtained by dividing samples at the median of these variables show that estimates
are very similar to zero in all subsamples, as shown in Table 4. 
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Table 2d: Estimated effects of the tax cap on local turnout on turnout, fixed effects regression
specification on matching-adjusted sample, post-1996 tax cap switches (see Appendix for
details).
These null results are stable, but not extremely precise. To appreciate the size of effects that can
be ruled out, consider the benchmark point estimate in Table 2a, the 95% confidence interval of
which ends at an effect of about 4 percentage points. One recurrent finding in the literature on
local turnout is that council-manager government is associated with turnout reductions of about
8% (Caren (2007), Hajnal and Lewis (2003)). Thus, based on the benchmark results in Table 2a,
it appears highly unlikely that the true effect of the tax cap on local turnout was more than half as
large than the effect of council-manager government in absolute terms. 
 
Additional analyses indicate that the tax cap also seems to have had little effect on the salience of
the property tax in local politics. To measure salience, I used an online database (“Access World
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Table 4: Estimated effects of the tax cap on local turnout in general elections for sub-samples of
census blocks, fixed effects regression specification without weighting.
Table 3: Estimated effects of the tax cap on local turnout in general elections for sub-samples of
registered voters, fixed effects regression specification without weighting.
News”) to count the number of articles and news items mentioning the term “property tax”, but
not the tax cap itself, in Illinois publications. Sources were assigned to counties based on the
address  of  publication,  and  yearly  article  counts  were  summed  up  over  sources  and  z-
standardized at the county level. Figure 4 provides a descriptive overview of this measure of
property tax salience across counties.  
Unfortunately,  since most of the digitized data begins in the late 1990s, there are only three
instances of counties adopting the tax cap for which newspaper data are available before and
after the switches. In order to visualize the development of newspaper mentions of the property
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Figure 4: Number of articles mentioning "property taxes", but not "tax cap", by
county and year in the "Access World News" database, Z-normalized. Lowess
estimates
tax  in  those  counties  before  and  after  implementation  of  the  tax  cap,  Figure  5  plots  the
normalized mentions per year in those counties relative to the time of tax cap adoption along
with a lowess estimate of the relationship. At least on the basis of this extremely small sample,
the salience of the property tax in the media does not appear to decline following institution of
the tax cap. 
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Figure 5: Articles mentioning the property tax per year at the county level
(z-normalized), relative to timing of the adoption of the tax cap. Lowess
estimate.  
6. Conclusion
Research  on  California’s  Proposition  13  suggests  that  the  tax  cap  reduced  local  political
participation.  However, this study finds no discernible effects  of a major property tax cap in
Illinois. What might account for this apparent divergence? 
First,  there might  be no divergence  at  all;  the Illinois  tax cap may have had a negative but
quantitatively small effect on turnout. Most estimates of its effect presented in the above study
are very close to zero, but small effects cannot be ruled out.  
Second, differences in the design of the tax cap plausibly matter. The Illinois tax cap may not
have had a sufficiently strong and direct economic effect to effectively reduce election stakes or
the salience  of  the property tax.  While  there is  clear  evidence  that  the cap was effective  at
reducing  revenue  growth  (Dye  and  McGuire  (1997)),  and  the  discussion  above  shows  that
relevant actors also perceived it to be effective, this effect was perhaps not as dramatic in terms
of overall revenue implications as California’s Proposition 13 analyzed by Sokolow (1998). 
Moreover, and perhaps crucially, the effects of the Illinois tax cap were spread out over time by
design: capping total revenue growth annually means that the total revenue effects of the policy
accumulate  over  the  long  run.  Such  incremental  changes  over  a  long time  horizon,  even  if
quantitatively  meaningful,  are  plausibly  more  likely  to  go  unnoticed  by voters.  In  contrast,
California's Proposition 13 reduced property taxes quite drastically from one year to the next in
many jurisdictions, giving voters a clear signal to interpret. The gradually increasing bite of the
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tax cap may also explain why the salience of the property tax did not decline measurably in those
counties for which newspaper data are available. 
Third, differences in local institutional context are also likely to condition the effects of tax caps
on political participation. For example, tax caps are only likely to reduce local election stakes if
local  government  spending is  really a key dimension of electoral  competition;  the degree to
which this is the case likely varies across locales. As another example, property taxes are highly
salient and unpopular everywhere (Cabral and Hoxby (2013)), but the degree to which they are
more salient than alternative revenue sources varies with the structure of local public finance
(e.g.  reliance  on  service  fees  versus  local  income  taxes).  Where  other  forms  of  revenue
generation are almost as salient as the property tax, the salience mechanism is likely to be muted.
 
Future research on this subject could assess whether the more abrupt changes engendered by
California’s Proposition 13 had measurable impacts on turnout in that state. Bringing additional
evidence to bear on this question could have important implications for the desirability of tax
caps,  since  lower  turnout  and citizen  monitoring  might  result  in  exacerbated  agency losses,
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8. Appendix: Matching procedure 
Here I describe the two matching procedures employed in the paper in more detail. In both cases,
the  strategy  is  to  pre-process  the  sample  by  discarding  control  observations  that  are  very
observationally dissimilar to the observations that were affected by the tax cap (Ho, Imai, King
and Stuart (2007)).  
 
In the first approach, I use 1991 data to predict whether an observation ever falls under the tax
cap. I use turnout in 1991, and the value and square of each of the following variables to predict
tax cap status: the median value of housing, median income, the share of owners, the share of
registered  voters  who  register  as  Democrats,  and  population  density.  I  use  nearest-neighbor
matching on the propensity-score (with replacement) to identify controls that are observationally
similar  to observations that  experienced the tax cap.  I  then discard control  observations  that
remain unused and run the benchmark fixed effects regression on this sample.  Table 5 displays
the balance of the covariates for the matched and unmatched samples. In the unmatched sample,
balance is very weak on some key covariates that one might expect to be important, such as the
share of registered voters that are Democrats, median income and median housing value. The
matching procedure almost universally improves balance, notably on economic covariates and
the share of Democrats. However, differences between treated and control observations in terms
of pre-treatment turnout, income, housing values and population density remain important even
after matching.  
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Table 5: Balance table, first matching approach.
Mean Standard Deviation
Variable Sample Treated Control Treated Control
Turnout – 1991 Unmatched 0.30 0.33 0.20 0.20
Matched 0.30 0.33 0.20 0.20
Median house value Unmatched 1.00E+05 42377 83926 15938
Matched 1.00E+05 88480 83926 41256
Median house value ² Unmatched 1.70E+10 2.00E+09 3.70E+10 1.70E+09
Matched 1.70E+10 9.50E+09 3.70E+10 7.20E+09
Median income Unmatched 56125 38277 28656 10072
Matched 56125 49370 28656 14078
Median income² Unmatched 4.00E+09 1.60E+09 5.10E+09 8.40E+08
Matched 4.00E+09 2.60E+09 5.10E+09 1.40E+09
Share of owners Unmatched 77.29 76.24 17.7 11
Matched 77.29 77.34 17.7 14.9
Share of owners² Unmatched 6287 5934 2415 1543
Matched 6287 6204 2415 2035
Share of reg. Dems Unmatched 0.55 0.5 0.1 0.1
Matched 0.55 0.55 0.1 0.1
Share of reg. Dems² Unmatched 0.33 0.26 0.2 0.1
Matched 0.33 0.31 0.2 0.1
Population Density Unmatched 0.0011 0.0004 0 0
Matched 0.0011 0.0005 0 0
Population Density² Unmatched 2.70E-06 5.80E-07 0 0
Matched 2.70E-06 8.70E-07 0 0
For the second approach, I first discard counties that were already treated before 1995. I then use
covariates to predict which observations were treated after 1995; the period when the tax cap was
expanded through county-level referenda. For this, I use the same covariates as above, as well as
turnout in local elections in the years 1991, 1993 and 1995. These pre-treatment outcomes are
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arguably  the  most  important  covariates,  since  differences  in  pre-treatment  turnout  patterns
between capped and uncapped observations are most likely to drive biases in the panel analysis.
As Table  6 shows,  balance  on pre-treatment  turnout  improves  substantially  when matching.
Moreover, balance on economic covariates is also significantly better than in procedure 1. This is
driven primarily by the fact that the observations discarded from counties treated before 1995 are
difficult to match, since they are disproportionately wealthy and dense. Just like in procedure 1, I
then discard unused control observations and estimate the fixed-effects model on this sample. In
interpreting these results, it should be kept in mind that discarding treated observations changes
the estimand (ATT), limiting comparability of results.
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Table 6: Balance table, second matching approach.
Mean Standard Deviation
Variable Sample Treated Control Treated Control
Turnout – 1995 Unmatched 0.25 0.32 0.2 0.2
Matched 0.25 0.27 0.2 0.2
Turnout – 1993 Unmatched 0.44 0.42 0.2 0.2
Matched 0.44 0.42 0.2 0.2
Turnout – 1991 Unmatched 0.28 0.32 0.2 0.2
Matched 0.28 0.27 0.2 0.2
Median house value Unmatched 52283 43165 24400 16487
Matched 52283 51935 24400 23134
Median house value ² Unmatched 3.30E+09 2.10E+09 3.70E+09 1.80E+09
Matched 3.30E+09 3.20E+09 3.70E+09 3.00E+09
Median income Unmatched 40945 38608 14323 10277
Matched 40945 39592 14323 13524
Median income² Unmatched 1.90E+09 1.60E+09 1.40E+09 8.70E+08
Matched 1.90E+09 1.80E+09 1.40E+09 1.20E+09
Share of owners Unmatched 73.74 76.19 16.5 11.1
Matched 73.74 71.74 16.5 17.1
Share of owners² Unmatched 5709 5927 2107 1546
Matched 5709 5438 2107 2186
Share of reg. Dems Unmatched 0.51 0.5 0.1 0.1
Matched 0.51 0.51 0.1 0.1
Share of reg. Dems² Unmatched 0.28 0.26 0.1 0.1
Matched 0.28 0.26 0.1 0.1
Population Density Unmatched 0.0007 0.0004 0 0
Matched 0.0007 0.0006 0 0
Population Density² Unmatched 1.20E-06 6.00E-07 0 0
Matched 1.20E-06 9.70E-07 0 0
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